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“[G]overnment of the people, by the people, and for the people shall 
not perish from the earth.”  
      ––Abraham Lincoln1  
 
 
Large-scale data brokers collect massive amounts of highly personal consumer 
information to be sold to whoever will pay their price, even at the expense of 
sacrificing individual privacy and autonomy in the process.  In this Article, I will 
show how a proper understanding and justification for a right to privacy, in context 
to both protecting private acts and safeguarding information and states of affairs for 
the performance of such acts, provides a necessary background framework for 
imposing legal restrictions on such collections. This problem, which has already 
gained some attention in literature, now becomes even more worrisome, as 
government itself becomes a consumer of this information to fight off a domestic 
instantiation of the global Covid-19 pandemic.  This Article proposes some definite 
ways in which the courts and Congress might limit both the private sector and the 
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 INTRODUCTION  
 
How successful we, as a people, are at achieving a government that is truly 
“of the people” will depend in great part on our ability to know our own interests and 
our ability to act on them based on our own reflections.  Humans appear to have this 
capacity of being autonomous insofar as we are able to generate options, deliberate 
on which option is best, and then stick to what we decide.2  Should this capacity be 
lost, humans may no longer conceive of themselves as engaged in self-rule, and any 
government they are a part of will no longer be thought of as being “of the people.”  
Of course, self-rule does not always reduce to being just able to act on one’s own 
interests and desires.  In cases where the very nature of our ability to act would be 
undercut, what appears as a personal choice may need to be temporarily set aside.  
But even where this is the case, it must be because our autonomy itself is in jeopardy 
of being undermined because the apparent personal choice of the individual is not 
really a personal choice of hers, but a highly sophisticated manipulation of her 
interests and desires originating from outside herself.   
Recent developments in the field of cyber-technology allow large private 
companies called “data brokers” to gather a wide range of personal information about 
individuals’ desires and wants, larger than even what would be gathered by 
 
2 Much disagreement exists regarding whether humans have free will.  See, e.g., Stephen Cave, Free Will 
Exists and Is Measurable, THE ATLANTIC (June 10, 2016, 9:45 AM), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2016/06/free-will-exists-and-is-measurable/486551/; Nicholas Clairmont, 
There’s No Such Thing as Free Will and Determinism, THE ATLANTIC (June 1, 2016, 6:35 PM), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2016/06/free-will-exists-and-is-measurable/486551/.  A classic view on this 
issue is found in Immanuel Kant’s discussion of free will as connected with individual autonomy.  According 
to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:  
Kant’s basic idea can be grasped intuitively by analogy with the idea of political 
freedom as autonomy.  Consider how political freedom in liberal theories is thought to be 
related to legitimate political authority: A state is free when its citizens are bound only by 
laws in some sense of their own making—created and put into effect, say, by vote or by 
elected representatives.  The laws of that state then express the will of the citizens who 
are bound by them.  The idea, then, is that the source of legitimate political authority is 
not external to its citizens, but internal to them, internal to “the will of the people.”  It is 
because the body politic created and enacted these laws for itself that it can be bound by 
them.  An autonomous state is thus one in which the authority of its laws is in the will of 
the people in that state, rather than in the will of a people external to that state, as when 
one state imposes laws on another during occupation or colonization.  In the latter case, 
the laws have no legitimate authority over those citizens.  In a similar fashion, we may 
think of a person as free when bound only by her own will and not by the will of another.  
Her actions then express her own will and not the will of someone or something else.  The 
authority of the principles binding her will is then also not external to her will.  It comes 
from the fact that she willed them.  So autonomy, when applied to an individual, ensures 
that the source of the authority of the principles that bind her is in her own will.  Kant’s 
view can be seen as the view that the moral law is just such a principle.  Hence, the “moral 
legitimacy” of the [Categorical Imperative] is grounded in its being an expression of each 
person’s own rational will.  It is because each person’s own reason is the legislator and 
executor of the moral law that it is authoritative for her.  
Kant’s Moral Philosophy, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (citations omitted), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/#Aut (last updated July 7, 2016). 
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companies such as Google and Facebook.  These data brokers usually gather this 
information without the individual’s knowledge, only to sell that information to other 
companies and users who will use it to target products, services, or solicit political or 
other actions.3  A recent report by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)4  states 
that the nine largest data brokers are: 
Acxiom, CoreLogic, Datalogix, eBureau, ID Analytics, Intelius, PeekYou, 
Rapleaf and Recorded Future[, and they] obtain and share vast amounts of 
consumer information, typically behind the scenes, without consumer 
knowledge.  Data brokers sell this information for marketing campaigns 
and fraud prevention, among other purposes.  Although consumers benefit 
from data broker practices which, for example, help enable consumers to 
find and enjoy the products and services they prefer, data broker practices 
also raise privacy concerns.5 
Such companies pose a serious threat to individual autonomy and democracy when 
they are able to learn through “private commercial mechanisms of information 
capture, production, analysis and sales” more about those they surveil than may be 
known even by the people who are the targets of their surveillance.6  In such 
circumstances, there is a real danger that individuals will be induced to act on 
interests, not necessarily of their own choosing, but that of those who use the 
information obtained to manipulate, or even manufacture, wants of their own. In such 
cases, individual freedom is lost if the behavior of the persons so affected no longer 
represents their own interests and desires, but those of some possibly unknown 
source.  That threat becomes even more problematic if government gets involved in 
trying to influence people without their knowledge by co-opting the information 
gathered by the private sector in an effort to affect what individuals believe and how 
they vote or behave, beyond what may have started out as a legitimate governmental 
need for the information.   
In the past, the right to privacy, which encompasses the right to gather 
information helpful in determining what to believe and how to act, provided a means 
for protection against this sort of threat, but that protection is now itself in danger of 
being lost or enfeebled by mechanisms of how information is gathered, as well as 
who is gathering the information.7  If the way information is now gathered and by 
whom no longer guarantees that privacy will be protected, the result will be a loss of 
 
3 Leo Mirani & Max Nisen, The Nine Companies That Know More About You Than Google or Facebook, 
QUARTZ (May 27, 2014), https://qz.com/213900/the-nine-companies-that-know-more-about-you-than-google-
or-facebook/.  See also FTC Recommends Congress Require the Data Broker Industry to be More Transparent 
and Give Consumers Greater Control Over Their Personal Information, FED. TRADE COMM’N (May 27, 2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/05/ftc-recommends-congress-require-data-broker-
industry-be-more?utm_source=govdelivery. 
4 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3. 
5 Id. 
6 Shoshana Zuboff, You Are Now Remotely Controlled: Surveillance Capitalists Control the Scientists, the 
Secrets and the Truth, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/24/opinion/sunday/surveillance-capitalism.html.  
7 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (acknowledging for the first time in dicta a constitutional 
[non-Fourth Amendment] right to informational privacy). 
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personal autonomy brought about because the private sector is inadequately regulated 
in the way it gathers information.  And that loss of autonomy will not just occur in 
the private sector but will likely percolate into the public arena as well, especially if 
government officials, who may have their own agendas, become involved in 
accessing the information.  The latter may occur initially very benignly when such 
officials or agencies react to a legitimate need for information to protect against a 
current crisis, like by tracking the movements of people to halt the spread of the novel 
coronavirus (“Covid-19”).  But it can very quickly be fitted into other areas, if the 
barriers to its escalation are not well laid out.   
This Article will describe some of the problems associated with maintaining 
individual autonomy in general, given new ways technology is used to support data 
collection methods, and how a more robust protection of individual privacy both by 
way of legislation and by court decisions might provide a defense.  Especially of 
concern will be to protect against the use of private data to manipulate individual 
wants and desires so as to undermine a full appreciation of the background 
considerations to choices, especially when directed to the performance of private acts 
and participation in democratic institutions.  It will also concern itself with protecting 
against benign and legitimate uses by government of underregulated information, 
which themselves could pose a threat to individual autonomy in the long run.  The 
Article will draw on a theory of how privacy might be understood and applied in court 
decisions and legislation, as a background to ensuring individual autonomy is not 
undermined.   
Section I will review a recent New York Times column that identifies types 
of manipulations commercial data collecting mechanisms can produce, as well as how 
they are used by companies to manufacture consumer behavior.  It will also concern 
itself with how information collected by commercial data collecting companies is 
being sought by state and federal officials to help stall the spread of Covid-19.  
Section II will review how, by examining prior English and American case law and 
scholarly articles, the understanding of legal privacy in the United States evolved to 
affirm protections for private acts and states of affairs, the latter focusing on 
information and places, both of which are essential to assure real participation in 
democratic institutions.  Section III will put forth a justification for the legal right to 
privacy, grounded in human autonomy, and notes how protecting private states of 
affairs guarantees both the protection of private acts and participation in democratic 
institutions.  Section IV will follow with an application of what the background theory 
for privacy provides, first by articulating a strategy for resolving conflicts of rights 
involving privacy and state assertions of a compelling interest.  Following that, this 
Section will consider how cyber-privacy concerns might be more fully protected in 
the future if legislation is introduced to afford greater authority to the FTC to produce 
regulations assuring the protection of personal information, as the technology 
continues to advance and government’s need for personal information continues to 
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I. MANIPULATIONS OF COMMERCIAL DATA TO MANUFACTURE CONSUMER 
BEHAVIOR AND HOW THAT GETS TRANSFERRED TO PREVENT THE SPREAD 
OF COVID-19 
 
In a very concerning article in the New York Times, prior to the recent Covid-19 
pandemic, Shoshana Zuboff warned that those of us who shop, connect, explore, 
research, or do just about anything on the internet are being remotely controlled not 
only in what we know, but in what can be learned about us.8  That information is 
further substantiated by the aforementioned FTC report on the nine largest data 
collection companies that gather tremendous amounts of personal data on nearly 
every U.S citizen and then sell that personal data, without a great deal of transparency, 
to whoever will pay the price.  According to the FTC report:  
• Data brokers collect consumer data from extensive online and 
offline sources, largely without consumers’ knowledge, ranging 
from consumer purchase data, social media activity, warranty 
registrations, magazine subscriptions, religious and political 
affiliations, and other details of consumers’ everyday lives.   
• Consumer data often passes through multiple layers of data 
brokers sharing data with each other.  In fact, seven of the nine 
data brokers in the Commission study had shared information 
with another data broker in the study. 
• Data brokers combine online and offline data to market to 
consumers online. 
• Data brokers combine and analyze data about consumers to 
make inferences about them, including potentially sensitive 
inferences such as those related to ethnicity, income, religion, 
political leanings, age, and health conditions.   Potentially 
sensitive categories from the study are “Urban Scramble” and 
“Mobile Mixers,” both of which include a high concentration of 
Latinos and African Americans with low incomes.  The 
category “Rural Everlasting” includes single men and women 
over age sixty-six with “low educational attainment and low net 
worths.”  Other potentially sensitive categories include health-
related topics or conditions, such as pregnancy, diabetes, and 
high cholesterol. 
• Many of the purposes for which data brokers collect and use 
data pose risks to consumers, such as unanticipated uses of the 
data.  For example, a category like “Biker Enthusiasts” could be 
used to offer discounts on motorcycles to a consumer, but could 
also be used by an insurance provider as a sign of risky 
behavior. 
 
8 Zuboff, supra note 6. 
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• Some data brokers unnecessarily store data about consumers 
indefinitely, which may create security risks. 
• To the extent data brokers currently offer consumers choices 
about their data, the choices are largely invisible and 
incomplete. 9 
Such gatherings of so much personal information on individual U.S. consumers 
creates a serious knowledge gap between those in the industry that have the 
information and the persons whom the information is about.  This gap in knowledge 
creates what Zuboff describes as an:  
Epistemic inequality [that] is not based on what we can earn but rather on 
what we can learn.  It is defined as unequal access to learning imposed by 
private commercial mechanisms of information capture, production, 
analysis and sales.  It is best exemplified in the fast-growing abyss between 
what we can know and what is known about us.10 
Zuboff claims that “[t]he new centrality of epistemic inequality signals a power shift 
from the ownership of the means of production, which defined the politics of the 20th 
century to the ownership of the production of meaning.”11  As she describes it: 
It isn’t only what you post online, but whether you use exclamation points 
or the color saturation of your photos; not just where you walk but the stoop 
of your shoulders; not just the identity of your face but the emotional states 
conveyed by your “microexpressions”; not just what you like but the pattern 
of likes across engagements.12 
 
9 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3. 
10 Zuboff, supra note 6. 
11 Id. 
12 Id.  Some states have already started restricting private entities, but not government entities, from 
gathering “biometric” information, mostly for the purpose of identity protection.  See, e.g., Illinois Biometric 
Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5 (2008).  In Illinois, the restrictions on gathering of 
“‘[b]iometric information’ means any information, regardless of how it is captured, converted, stored, or shared, 
based on an individual's biometric identifier used to identify an individual.”  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 (2010).  
“Biometric identifiers” in Illinois are those physical features that “are biologically unique to the individual” such 
that “once compromised, the individual has no recourse, is at heightened risk for identity theft, and is likely to 
withdraw from biometric-facilitated transactions.”  740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5 (2008).  Illinois law identifies 
the following biometric identifiers:  
[A] retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geometry.  
Biometric identifiers do not include writing samples, written signatures, photographs, 
human biological samples used for valid scientific testing or screening, demographic data, 
tattoo descriptions, or physical descriptions such as height, weight, hair color, or eye 
color.   
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 (2010).  Not “include[d are] biological materials regulated under the Genetic 
Information Privacy Act” nor “information captured from a patient in a health care setting or information 
collected, used, or stored for health care treatment, payment, or operations under the federal Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.”  Id.  Additionally, Illinois does not include under biometric 
identifiers “an X-ray, roentgen process, computed tomography, MRI, PET scan, mammography, or other image 
or film of the human anatomy used to diagnose, prognose, or treat an illness or other medical condition or to 
further validate scientific testing or screening.”  Id.  Still, despite Illinois’ efforts to restrict biometric information 
that can give rise to identity theft, more needs to be done nationally to also limit opportunities for manipulation 
of individual behavior that might otherwise go unnoticed. 
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Another example she notes of this epistemic inequality and its use in altering 
individual behavior was found when:  
The Australian exposed [Facebook’s] interest in applying “psychological 
insights” from “internal Facebook data” to modify user behavior.  The 
targets were 6.4 million young Australians and New Zealanders.  “By 
monitoring posts, pictures, interactions and internet activity in real time,” 
the executives wrote, “Facebook can work out when young people feel 
‘stressed,’ ‘defeated,’ ‘overwhelmed,’ ‘anxious,’ ‘nervous,’ ‘stupid,’ 
‘silly,’ ‘useless,’ and a ‘failure.’”  This depth of information, they 
explained, allows Facebook to pinpoint the time frame during which a 
young person needs a “confidence boost” and is most vulnerable to a 
specific configuration of subliminal cues and triggers.  The data are then 
used to match each emotional phase with appropriate ad messaging for 
maximum probability of guaranteed sales.13 
This shift in power from industrial capitalism (often marked by large, 
multinational corporations’ ownership of the means of production) to what Zuboff 
describes as “ownership of the production of meaning” challenges even governmental 
control over populations that previously was seen as supported by the means of 
production.14  This may be responsible for a rise in government efforts to become 
more inclined to adopt similar technological means, when the opportunity permits, as 
a way to also regain lost authority against the growing and largely amorphous private 
sector of industry giants.15 
 The thrust of Zuboff’s article also reaffirms the civil libertarian’s concern 
that this new and growing surveillance reality presents “an unprecedented threat to 
individual freedom.”16  In reference to that threat, Zuboff writes: 
 
13 Zuboff, supra note 6 (quoting Facebook Targets ‘Insecure’ Kids, THE AUSTRALIAN (May 2017), 
https://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/media/facebook-targetsinsecure-young-people-to-sell-ads/news-
story/a89949ad016eee7d7a61c3c30c909fa6.).   
14 Id.  Karl Marx argued that society’s superstructure, including its ideology, politics, norms, religion, 
philosophy, education, art, family, culture, and science emerges from and is shaped and maintained by its base, 
the means of production, including the relations of production that means establish, which for modern Western 
democratic societies is capitalism.  See Nicki Lisa Cole, Definition of Base and Superstructure: Core Concepts 
of Marxist Theory, THOUGHTCO. (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.thoughtco.com/definition-of-base-and-
superstructure-3026372.  Moreover, as the superstructure becomes established, it, in turn, legitimizes and 
maintains the base that gives it rise.  See id. 
15 See Nigel Barber, Social Networks Challenge Government: Democratic Government is Challenged by 
the Internet on Two Fronts, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/the-
human-beast/201804/social-networks-challenge-government (pointing to both terror networks and Silicon 
Valley, illustrated by the Arab Spring, “and the widespread use of Twitter to organize protests”).  Indeed, 
President Trump’s use of Twitter to reshape the presidency might be seen as a way to enlist a similar process in 
service to his own political purposes.  See Michael D. Shear et. al., How Trump Reshaped the Presidency in 
Over 11,000 Tweets, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/02/us/politics/trump-twitter-presidency.html.  
16 Zuboff, supra note 6 (quoting John M. Broder, F.T.C. Opens Hearings on Computers’ Threat to Privacy 
and Liberty, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/11/us/ftc-opens-hearings-on-
computers-threat-to-privacy-and-liberty.html?searchResultPosition=34). 
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Early on, it was discovered that, unknown to users, even data 
freely given harbors rich predictive signals, a surplus that is more than what 
is required for service improvement. . . . 
The data are conveyed through complex supply chains of devices, 
tracking and monitoring software, and ecosystems of apps and companies 
that specialize in niche data flows captured in secret.  For example, testing 
by [t]he Wall Street Journal showed that Facebook receives heart rate data 
from the Instant Heart Rate: HR Monitor, menstrual cycle data from the Flo 
Period & Ovulation Tracker, and data that revealed interest in real estate 
properties from Realtor.com—all of it without user knowledge.17 
 What this New York Times column so pointedly perceived as a danger to 
individual autonomy becomes even more momentous given the outbreak of Covid-
19, which has forced a large segment of the workforce to hibernate in their homes, 
doing whatever work they can online.18  Indeed, because it is reasonable to expect 
that even after the virus eventually comes under control and people no longer suffer 
remaining at home, much of normal work life will have converted into an online 
modus vivendi.19  This being likely, it becomes even more concerning that individual 
privacy be protected from the additional opportunities this will provide data collectors 
to gather information and their potential purchasers to use the information to affect 
consumer behavior in this new internet work environment.20   
 Currently, several software companies are developing programs to track cell 
phone users to see if they are complying with “stay-at-home” orders.21  Even more 
significantly, several state governments are encouraging this development and 
making use of this service in order to try to get a better handle on how the Covid-19 
 
17 Id. 
18 Prior to the outbreak of the coronavirus, the number of people working from home had already increased.  
U.S. census data indicates that the number of workers working from home in 2017 was 5.2%, or approximately 
eight million people.  That number was up from 5% in 2016 and 3.3% in 2000.  See Dan Kopf, Slowly but Surely 
Working from Home is Becoming More Common, QUARTZ AT WORK (Sept. 17, 2018), 
https://qz.com/work/1392302/more-than-5-of-americans-now-work-from-home-new-statistics-show/.  A 
Gallup survey had shown that those who work remotely at least part of the time was up from 39% in 2010 to 
43% in 2016.  See Annemarie Mann & Amy Adkins, America’s Coming Workplace: Home Alone, GALLUP 
(Mar. 15, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/businessjournal/206033/america-coming-workplace-home-
alone.aspx?utm_source=link_wwwv9&amp;utm_campaign=item_236222&amp;utm_medium=copy. 
19 See Catherine Thorbecke, As Coronavirus Spreads in the US, Employers Gear Up for Massive Work-
From-Home Experiment: Experts Share Tips on How to Stay Afloat and Operational Amid an Outbreak, ABC 
NEWS (Mar. 3, 2020, 5:30 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Business/coronavirus-spreads-us-employers-gear-
massive-work-home/story?id=69282662. 
20 It is interesting to note that given the prevalence of cloud computing and evidence for ordinary criminal 
investigations being increasingly held in servers in different countries, the U.S. and other foreign governments 
have had to confront privacy concerns, when sharing personal information, which for the U.S. fall under the 
Fourth Amendment, See Peter Swire & Justin Hemmings, Overcoming Constitutional Objections to the CLOUD 
Act, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.acslaw.org/issue_brief/briefs-landing/overcoming-
constitutional-objections-to-the-cloud-act-2/. 
21 See Geoffrey A. Fower, Smartphone Data Reveal Which Americans Are Social Distancing (and not), 
WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/03/24/social-distancing-
maps-cellphone-location/. 
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virus is spreading, so its spread can be halted.22  Obviously, in this period of a global 
pandemic that so far has taken 2,174,702 lives worldwide23 and over 419,827 lives in 
the United States alone,24 with the further expectation that these numbers will be 
increasing in the U.S. to over 500,000, government efforts to halt the spread of this 
disease would appear to be a compelling interest.25  And, no doubt, courts, if asked to 
consider the privacy of individuals when considering these matters, will likely uphold 
the state’s compelling interest to gain whatever information is needed to halt the 
spread of this disease.26   
Where the issue of protecting individual privacy and liberty really takes hold, 
now that government itself is getting into the act of accessing highly personal 
consumer information, is what happens after the Covid-19 threat is eliminated.  
Certainly, there are those in the government and the private sector who will want to 
keep available this tracking information.  Obviously, many private businesses may 
find it helpful to identify markets where they might sell their products.27  But beyond 
those private commercial interests is the likely government interest, both federal and 
state, to track those who might be suspected of criminal activity or, more urgently, 
those who might be involved in a terrorist plot.28  Additionally, one can easily 
 
22 See Hollie Silverman, New Mexico Using Cell Phone Data to Create Social Distancing Models and 
Considering More Restrictive Travel Measures, CNN (Apr. 10, 2020), 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/09/us/new-mexico-cell-phone-data-track-residents/index.html.  Although the 
U.S. government has, as yet, not used cell phones “to enforce stay-at-home orders or track patients,” it is engaged 
“in talks with Facebook, Google and other tech companies about using anonymous location data to combat the 
coronavirus, including tracking whether people are keeping at safe distances from one another.”  Fower, supra 
note 21; see also Tony Romm et. al., U.S. Government, Tech Industry Discussing Ways to Use Smartphone 
Location Data to Combat Coronavirus, WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/03/17/white-house-location-data-coronavirus/. 
23 Covid-19 Coronavirus Pandemic, WORLDOMETER, https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/ (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
24 CDC COVID Data Tracker: Maps, Charts, and Data Provided by the CDC, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
25 See Susannah Luthi, U.S. on Pace to Pass 100,000 Covid-19 Deaths by June 1, 2020, CDC Director 
Says: This Marks the First Time Robert Redfield Has Explicitly Addressed the Grim Milestone, POLITCO (May 
15, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/15/us-on-pace-to-pass-100-000-covid-19-deaths-by-june-1-
cdc-director-says-261468. 
A “compelling interest” has been described as follows: 
A compelling state (or governmental) interest is an element of the strict scrutiny test 
by which courts exercise judicial review of legislative and executive branch enactments 
that effect constitutional rights, such as those found in the First Amendment.   
An interest is compelling when it is essential or necessary rather than a matter of 
choice, preference, or discretion. 
Ronald Steiner, Compelling State Interest, THE FIRST AMEND. ENCYCLOPEDIA (2009), 
https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/31/compelling-state-interest.  
27 See Haris Bacic, Become a Data Genius: Track Everything in Your Small Business, FORBES (June 20, 
2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness/2016/06/20/become-a-data-genius-track-everything-in-your-
small-business/#4d6d10748797. 
28 See Editorial, The Government Uses ‘Near Perfect Surveillance’ Data on Americans: Congressional 
Hearings are Urgently Needed to Address Location Tracking, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/opinion/dhs-cell-phone-tracking.html.  In an e-mail from U.S. Senator 
Richard J. Durbin to Vincent J. Samar, dated July 17, 2020, it is noted that “we have seen a worrying trend of 
companies like Clearview Al scraping photographs from social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter, and 
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understand, once this information becomes readily available, the government’s 
concern to have access to it in order to plan for the next pandemic that might pose an 
even graver infection threat to the country.29  In addition to the traditional Fourth 
Amendment concerns this poses with respect to law enforcement, there is the concern 
that this information may be used to track political dissent and other forms of legal 
anti-government activity. 
 That said, commercial interference with personal privacy should not be all 
that surprising.  The twentieth-century economist John Kenneth Galbraith, in a now-
famous article entitled The Dependence Effect, written long before the development 
of the internet, identified how commercial interference with personal privacy and 
liberty was already taking place back in the 1950s.30  Then, he wrote that human 
“wants are dependent on production.”31  “As a society becomes increasingly affluent, 
wants are increasingly created by the process by which they are satisfied.  This may 
operate passively.  Increases in consumption, the counterpart of increases in 
production, act by suggestion or emulation to create wants.”32  Galbraith’s point was 
to declare what was already known, the “more direct link between production and 
wants [that] is provided by the institutions of modern advertising and 
salesmanship.”33  As to that link, Galbraith writes, any “businessman and the lay 
reader will be puzzled over the emphasis which I give to a seemingly obvious point.”34  
But if Galbraith’s concern was real back in the 1950s, then all the more should his 
concern be applied to the way today’s private commercial mechanisms of information 
gathering and information sale operate to control our needs and wants by offering us 
products to attend to them.  If producers can, through the use of various private 
mechanisms of information technology, learn of an individual’s developing wants and 
desires, perhaps even before the individual himself has become aware of them, then 
the likelihood of individuals being shuffled down a specific path toward satisfying 
their wants, without a chance to fully appreciate which wants are worth satisfying and 
 
amassing databases of Americans who have no idea that their photographs are in a facial recognition database 
for law enforcement use.”  E-mail from Senator Richard J. Durbin to Vincent Samar (July 17, 2020, 1:50 PM 
EST) (on file with author).  That same e-mail also expressed concerns “about overuse or misuse of this 
technology, given that few laws or court rulings have established guidelines or boundaries on when or where 
this technology can or should be used.”  Id.  It noted that “[f]acial recognition technology had been found to be 
far less accurate when analyzing the faces of women or people of color.”  Id.  And that following the death of 
George Floyd, “[m]any expressed concern that law enforcement agencies could use facial recognition 
technology to identify who participated in these peaceful protests.”  Id.  
29 Currently,  
[i]n seeking to battle the coronavirus, the U.S. government is not seeking to collect 
and maintain a database of Americans’ whereabouts, sources cautioned.  Rather, U.S. 
officials have asked whether companies’ vast stores of geolocation data might help 
epidemiologists spot trends, including vulnerable populations, or identify areas at risk, 
such as hospitals under strain, two people said. 
 Romm et al., supra note 22. 
30 John Kenneth Galbraith, The Dependence Effect, in THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 126 (40th Anniversary ed., 
1998). 
31 Id. at 126, 129. 
32 Id. at 131.   
33 Id. at 129. 
34 Id. at 130. 
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by how much, is greatly increased.  This is where human freedom and individual 
privacy become most at risk.   
 As a consequence of this concern, some may wish for an earlier time where 
such personal interference by use of technology with a person’s private life was not 
possible.  But even aside from the fact that we cannot turn back the clock, it remains 
doubtful that we should want to.  The above discussion of information mechanisms 
following where people travel or what they might desire has legitimate uses, as the 
social distance tracking involved in responding to the coronavirus teaches.  Where 
society fails is not with regard to allowing such legitimate uses, but with failing to 
provide the equally important attention needed to contain such uses only to their 
legitimate purposes.  The genie may be out of the bottle, but the space in which the 
genie is allowed to operate should be controlled.  Proper use of laws to protect basic 
privacy rights is essential if society is to continue to evolve technologically while still 
remaining democratic.  So, it is to the privacy side of this equation, what it means and 
how it is justified, that we must now turn. 
 
II. PRIVACY AND THE LAW 
 
Our current discussion of privacy and technological intrusions needs to be 
clarified.  How exactly does technology intrude on privacy?  Does it only potentially 
threaten private information?  Might private acts be involved?  Additionally, what is 
a private act?  How does information about one’s wants, desires, current 
psychological state, or places one visits on websites implicate not only private 
information, but private acts as well?  Together, answering these questions should 
unravel at least some of the more obvious concerns commercial-information-
gathering technology places on the performance of private acts.  More importantly, it 
should provide a framework for how questions about information gathering should 
get decided.  The previous Section expressed a concern over the clandestine use of 
personal information to affect private behavior.  The next Section will show how the 
protection of private acts is logically, if not temporally, prior to protecting autonomy.  
Given this arrangement, the discussion here will first focus on making sense of what 
is meant by a private act and its prudential connection to private information and 
places. 
  Ultimately, this arrangement hopes to show how private acts describe a basic 
liberty at the core of our concern for protecting individual autonomy.  A concern 
closely related to protecting private acts is protecting private information and states 
of affairs, which turns out to be prudentially necessary for private acts to occur.  
Because performance of private actions can be attenuated when too much personal 
information is made generally available, limits are needed on just how much personal 
information should legally be available for use in influencing private behavior.  Such 
limits are also needed to offset potential illegal uses, even in contexts where 
government legitimately seeks to gain information from private sector data banks to 
respond to a global pandemic.  So, let us begin by first stating what is meant by a 
private act. 
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The definition that will be put forth is derived from an analysis of how cases 
arising in the Fourth Amendment,35 tort,36 and constitutional areas of the law appear 
to overlap.37  This is important because the privacy right to be offered is broader than 
what any one area of the law would recognize.  Early understandings that gave rise to 
the Fourth Amendment (such as reasonable expectations of privacy),38 the tort area 
 
35 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 62–63 (1967) (striking down a New York statute that would allow an 
ex parte order for eavesdropping if there were a reasonable belief that it might produce evidence of a crime); 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (holding that an FBI wiretap of a phone booth was subject to 
Fourth Amendment protections).  Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz introduces the idea of a 
“reasonable expectation” of privacy, which occurs with regard to what might be overheard when the glass door 
of a phone booth is shut.  Katz,  389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
36 In an important article on tort privacy, Professor William Prosser identifies the following four areas of 
tort privacy questions, sometimes giving rise to constitutional questions when the government acts to promote 
or restrain common law privacy torts:   
(1) Regarding seclusion and solitude, see Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626 
(1951), which allowed a municipality to ban commercial solicitations at private residences on the 
basis of “the living right of [people] to privacy [in the sense of being left alone] and repose.”  See 
also Pub. Utils. Comm’n of D.C. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (holding that the privacy of bus 
passengers was violated because busses carried FM receivers, which broadcast music, news, and 
sometimes commercial advertising). 
(2) Regarding the reporting of embarrassing private facts, see Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931) (allowing a former prostitute who had been involved in a murder trial to 
sue when, seven years after her acquittal and after she had made new life for herself, a movie, The 
Red Kimono, was made depicting her earlier life).  Contra Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Co., 113 F.2d 806 (2d 
Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940) (upholding the First Amendment right of the New 
Yorker magazine to report on an infant prodigy who intentionally disappeared from public life 
because the matter was of public interest). 
(3) Regarding being placed in a false light in the public eye, see Lord Byron v. Johnson, 35 
Eng. Rep. 851 (1816), in which the court held fixing Byron’s name to a poem he did not write was 
actionable.  But see Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 394 (1967) (holding Life magazine’s publication 
of a story falsely depicting the infliction of violence on the Hill family taken as hostages by three 
escaped convicts was not actionable because it was not published “with knowledge of [its] falsity or 
in reckless disregard of the truth”).  Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion, noted that “[s]uch 
privacy as a person normally has ceases when his life has ceased to be private.”  Id. at 401 (Douglas, 
J., concurring). 
(4) Regarding the appropriation of a person’s name or likeness, see Roberson v. Rochester 
Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902), superseded by statute, N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50–51 
(McKinney 2020), as recognized in Lohan v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 31 N.E.3d 389 
(N.Y. 2018).  Following a ruling in favor of the defendant, after a woman’s likeness had been made 
to adorn a package of Flour of the Family without her permission, the New York legislature passed 
a statute affording privacy protection from commercial exploitation.   
William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
37 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a Connecticut statute that prohibited married 
couples from using contraceptives and doctors from advising on their use violated a constitutional right to 
privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that a constitutional right to privacy extends to 
unmarried persons); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a constitutional right to privacy includes a 
woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy before the third trimester); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 
678 (1977) (holding that a constitutional right to privacy extends to minors to purchase contraceptives); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that state criminal laws prohibiting same-sex consensual 
intimacy in the home violate basic interests in constitutional privacy and intimacy under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
38 Long before the Fourth Amendment came into existence was the Magna Carta provision providing, “[n]o 
freeman shall be taken or (and) imprisoned and diseased or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon 
him nor send upon him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or (and) by the law of the land.”  SAMUEL 
E. THORNE ET AL., THE GREAT CHARTER: FOUR ESSAYS ON MAGNA CARTA AND THE HISTORY OF OUR LIBERTY 
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(including seclusion and solitude, not having embarrassing facts disseminated, not 
being placed in a false light, or having one’s likeness exploited for commercial 
purposes),39 and constitutional privacy (involving intimate decisions)40 are well 
known.  The overlap is found in the fact that issues of privacy in all three of these 
areas of the law assert a claim to negative freedom in the sense of “the self-to-be-let-
alone”41 but must also be “self-regarding,” in the sense that no other person’s basic 
interest is involved.42  This is an important background recognition in uniting the three 
areas, for, on their own, the Fourth Amendment and tort areas are more related to 
privacy of information, whereas the constitutional area (other than Fourth 
Amendment criminal procedure) is more related to intimate actions that the 
government has little business in preventing.  Additionally, privacy claims under the 
Fourth Amendment and other constitutional areas are against the government, since 
the Constitution and Bill of Rights only pose restrictions on the government, whereas 
tort privacy claims involve civil actions between individual persons or groups.43  As 
an assurance that any claim to privacy will not be open to wide speculation about just 
how another’s interest may be affected, it is necessary to impose a requirement that 
the mere description of the act “without the inclusion of any additional facts or causal 
theories” would not suggest a conflict with any other person’s interest.44  This 
requirement is necessary to ensure the definition will stand on its own, establishing a 
prima facie case prior to any additional evidence being brought forth to show the 
privacy claim should be overridden in a particular case.  One other factor that needs 
to be considered concerns the possible range of the interest involved.  Obviously, if 
the idea of an “interest” is left too open-ended, the possibility arises that no action 
 
132 (1965).  See also Semayne’s Case (1603) 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B.) (holding that, absent prior notice of the 
sheriff’s arrival, a joint tenant can refuse an attempted execution on the personal property of the decedent 
judgment-holder).  
39 See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) 
(providing the foundation for recognizing a tort right to privacy).  
40 In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967), Justice Brandeis dissented with a statement far broader than the Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues the 
case turned on.  Brandeis wrote:  
The protection guaranteed by the amendments is much broader in scope.  The 
makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of 
happiness.  They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and 
of his intellect.  They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life 
are to be found in material things.  They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their 
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.  They conferred, as against the government, 
the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by 
civilized men.   
Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
41 VINCENT J. SAMAR, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 65 (1991). 
42 Id. at 65–67. 
43 A tort is “a civil wrong or wrongful act, whether intentional or accidental, from which injury occurs to 
another.”  Tort, THE PEOPLE’S LAW DICTIONARY (emphasis added), 
https://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=2137 (last visited 1/1/21). 
44 SAMAR, supra note 41, at 67. 
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might ever be considered private.45  Thus, to have a meaningful definition of a private 
act, the interests it must affect are limited to only basic interests in freedom and well-
being.  This is necessary to ensure that the scope of the interest involved is not 
overbroad but restricted to only encompass such basic concerns, which, on the 
freedom side, include “freedom of expression, privacy, freedom of thought, worship” 
and, on the well-being side, are “life, health, physical integrity (as in not being 
assaulted), and mental equilibrium (as in not be subject to mental harassment).”46  
Such interests are separate from any derivative concerns that presuppose conceptions 
“about facts or social conventions.”47  The latter could undermine the notion of a 
private act if not segregated out by making the very idea of a private act open to 
challenge by others who might have a derivate interest in the outcome.  Thus, 
adjusting for these concerns, a definition of a private act emerges.  That definition 
states, “[a]n action is self-regarding (private) with respect to a group of other actors 
if and only if the consequences of the act impinge in the first instance on the basic 
interests of the actor and not on the interests of the specified class of actors.”48 
 What is also interesting to note about the definition is that it is a relational 
definition.  That is to say, what may be private between one group of people may not 
be private if a different group were involved.  Whether I wear a toupee, for example, 
would not likely be private to my immediate family but should, all else being equal, 
be private to the IRS.49  By the same token, what my income was last year may be 
private as regards certain family members but certainly not private to the IRS.  
Consequently, in making a privacy claim, it is necessary to specify the particular 
group the claim is being applied to.  Additionally, it is necessary to limit the meaning 
of “in the first instance” in the definition to only what a “mere description of the act” 
would entail, when confined to only basic interests.  This will provide the basis for 
when a claim to an act being private can be plausibly set forth.  It does not, however, 
explain why the law should care about protecting private acts, nor does it provide the 
conditions under which a private act might be intruded upon.  That would require a 
justification for a right to privacy separate from any understanding of its meaning.  
Before addressing that issue, however, it should be helpful to also explain more 
precisely what is meant by private “states of affairs,” which include both information 
and places, and how this area of privacy law relates to private actions.  In the case of 
privacy of information and places, a corollary definition to the first reads: “[a] state 
of affairs is private with respect to a group of other actors if and only if there is a 
 
45 See id. at 66.  For example, if a person had an interest in never having to see a red stop sign because 
seeing red stop signs made them sick in the stomach, the placement of a red stop sign outside the home would 
violate the person’s privacy right to freely travel where one wanted to. 
46 Id. at 68. 
47 Id.  “An example of a derivative interest [on the well-being side] is to receive a good education,” since 
the interest combines “the basic interest in well-being . . . with the factual conception that one’s well-being will 
be benefited by education.”  Id.  On the freedom side, “being allowed to marry is derivative of the basic interest 
in freedom combined with the social convention of marriage.”  Id. 
48 Id. (emphasis in original).  
49 See id. at 64–65. 
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convention, recognized by members of the group, that defines, protects, preserves, or 
guards that state of affairs for the performance of private acts.”50 
Here a state of affairs might include limiting the availability and use of 
information only to a limited number of people, as well as to provide a convention 
for determining the places where private acts might be performed.  What is 
particularly interesting to note about this second definition is how it is connected to 
private acts.  It is saying that private states of affairs provide for the possibility of 
private acts occurring.  This will need further explanation below.  For the moment, 
one notes that the second definition, unlike the first, is culturally relative in the sense 
that a convention will need to be recognized by members of the relevant group to 
protect the state of affairs for the performance of private acts.  That convention could 
be simply the closing of shutters to one’s windows or of a glass door on a phone booth 
(as in the past), the locking away of papers, or adopting certain  notices or behaviors 
to signal that confidentiality is expected.  As will be explained, societies that seek to 
protect private acts will find it necessary to set out a set of conventions to limit the 
availability of information about private acts and prevent intrusion into places where 
they may occur. 
 Why should it be necessary to protect certain states of affairs as private in 
order for private acts to be practicable?  The problem here is one of psychology.51  
People are often intimidated by what others may learn about them.52  The intimidation 
may assume many forms, from public disagreement with what one plans to do, to 
challenges to one’s beliefs, to attacks on one’s thinking process and personal choices 
as being immoral, irreligious, or possibly illegal.  In short, protection of private states 
 
50 Id. at 73. (emphasis in original).  
51 A recent article that appeared on NBC’s website notes:  
Psychology says that part of human nature’s default mode is to be social.  One 
theory: people have an innate (and very powerful) need to belong.  Some key arguments 
(published in the journal Psychological Bulletin in 1995) [present] evidence that shows 
most people make social ties under most conditions—and most people try to avoid 
breaking those ties if they can. 
Sarah DiGiulio, In Good Company: Why We Need Other People to be Happy, NBC NEWS: BETTER HEALTH 
(Jan. 9, 2019, 1:50 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/better/health/good-company-why-we-need-other-people-
be-happy-ncna836106.  The article goes on to point out that a strong social network allows our brains to work 
better and tends to give people a longer lifespan.  But the article then goes on to warn: 
The exception is when a relationship’s negatives outshine its benefits.  Be wary if a 
relationship encourages bad habits or causes distress, says Debra Umberson, PhD, 
Professor of Sociology and Director of the Population Research Center at the University 
of Texas at Austin.  “A bad relationship is worse than no relationship when it comes to 
health.” 
Id. 
52 Even in situations where the psychological effect may be thought to be benign or in service 
to a good cause, it should not be dismissed.   
The psychological effect of being watched by others has been proven a powerful 
tool in boosting honest or charitable behaviors while reducing dishonest behaviors.  This 
watching effect increases self-awareness and causes individual[s] to consciously modify 
their behavior to increase compliance with social standards.  
Jiaxin Yu et al., Being Watched by Others Inhibits the Effect of Emotional Arousal on Inhibitory 
Control, FRONTIERS IN PSYCH. (Jan. 20, 2015) (citations omitted), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4299288/. 
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of affairs turns out to be indirectly connected to the protection of an individual’s 
autonomy, self-identity, and well-being.53  One does not have to reach very far into 
the history of the United States to find examples where individual autonomy might 
have been constrained when hotly contested viewpoints were debated, such as 
occurred over abolishing slavery,54 affording women the right to vote,55 providing 
equality of opportunity to racial minorities,56 and granting equal liberty to same-sex 
couples to marry.57  Human nature is such that people are concerned with how they 
are viewed by relatives, friends, neighbors, and other members of society.58  If that 
concern has no boundaries, the effect may very well be to constrain individual 
autonomy.  Additionally, democratic societies in particular stand to lose if “the 
permanent interests of man as a progressive being”59 could be undercut by adverse 
public opinion, where such society’s interests in controlling individual autonomy may 
be, at most, only indirect,60 and where such adverse public opinion would undermine 
an individual’s ability to figure out what really is in her own best interests. 
 
53 In a 2009 report by the Institute of Medicine, it is noted that:  
There are a variety of reasons for placing a high value on protecting the privacy, 
confidentiality, and security of health information.  Some theorists depict privacy as a 
basic human good or right with intrinsic value.  They see privacy as being objectively 
valuable in itself, as an essential component of human well-being.  They believe that 
respecting privacy (and autonomy) is a form of recognition of the attributes that give 
humans their moral uniqueness. 
 The more common view is that privacy is valuable because it facilitates or 
promotes other fundamental values, including ideals of personhood such as: 
• Personal autonomy (the ability to make personal decisions) 
• Individuality 
• Respect 
• Dignity and worth as human beings 
INST. OF MED., BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: ENHANCING PRIVACY, IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH 
RESEARCH 77 (Sharyl J. Nass et al. eds., 2009) (citations omitted), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK9579/.   
54 See 1832 Speech Given in the House of Delegates Regarding Abolition, THE HISTORY ENGINE, 
https://historyengine.richmond.edu/episodes/view/3883 (last visited May 17, 2020). 
55 See JoEllen Lind, Dominance and Democracy: The Legacy of Woman Suffrage for the Voting Right, 5 
UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 103 (1994). 
56 See The Civil Rights Movement and the Second Reconstruction, 1945–1968, HISTORY, ART & 
ARCHIVES: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, https://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-and-
Publications/BAIC/Historical-Essays/Keeping-the-Faith/Civil-Rights-Movement/ (last visited May 17, 2020). 
57 See Murray Dry, The Same-Sex Marriage Controversy and American Constitutionalism: Lessons 
Regarding Federalism, the Separation of Powers, and Individual Rights, 39 VT. L. REV. 275 (2014). 
58 In Politics, Aristotle remarks, “[M]an is by nature a political animal.  And he who by nature and not by 
mere accident is without a state, is either a bad man or above humanity . . . .”  ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (Benjamin 
Jowett trans., 2009), http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.html.  Psychologists talk about the need to belong 
as influencing human behavior and motivation.  See Kendra Cherry, How the Need to Belong Influences Human 
Behavior and Motivation, VERYWELL MIND (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.verywellmind.com/what-is-the-need-
to-belong-2795393. 
59 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859), reprinted in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 264 (Max 
Lerner ed., 1961).  Although Mill was a utilitarian, he stated that “it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded 
on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being.”  Id.  
60 See id. at 265, where Mill acknowledges that: 
[t]here is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the individual, 
has, if any, only an indirect interest; comprehending all that portion of a person’s life and 
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Since this article is focused on cyber-security and privacy, the reader might 
be inclined at this point to consider how protecting human autonomy by protecting 
privacy relates, by analogy, to shielding the core processor of a computer from being 
infected by malware or the human brain from being subject only to indoctrinating 
propaganda without any allowance for critical thinking.  The goal of the protection is 
not to disallow information from being considered by either the processor or the mind 
but, in the case of the human mind, because it has the capacity to deliberate, it is to 
ensure that any consideration of the information’s merits is critically evaluated.61  
Were such limits not imposed, the choices even of the human mind, like the results 
put forth by the processor, may very little reflect the purposes animating its use. 
Even if, when deliberating over whether to adopt a particular belief or set of 
beliefs, the person’s choice turns out to be faulty (leaving aside how that would be 
measured), there would still be a major loss to autonomy if the person was not allowed 
to discover this error for herself by critical thinking on her own.  This is not to say 
that the purpose of protecting private states of affairs should be to allow people to do 
wrongful actions or to exclude others from helping them consider relevant 
information.  Nor is it to say that engaging others in thinking through a problem may 
not add significantly to the process of deliberation.  It is to say that the process of 
determining how one’s own life goes forward, including what policies one will 
support or beliefs one will hold, should not be constrained from outside, unless there 
is a clear indication that harm to others will occur.  For indeed, if people did not have 
a space to determine their own beliefs regarding how to live their own lives, society 
itself would suffer the real harm of being unsure in whose interest it was operating.  
As is shown by social influence studies, individuals do not always just follow the 
group but sometimes actually do evaluate the information they are presented, and 
when they do, depending on their strength of will, may be in a better position to make 
up their own mind and be a part of a democratic process that upholds individual rights 
and affirms the authority of the law.62  Especially should this be true when the matter 
 
conduct which affects only himself, or if it affects others, only with their free, voluntary, 
and undeceived consent and participation. 
61 Christine Korsgaard makes an important point in discussing how the human mind operates as a source 
of normativity.  In her book, The Sources of Normativity, Korsgaard writes:  
[O]ur capacity to turn our attention on to our own mental activities [something 
Korsgaard claims other animals do not do] is also a capacity to distance ourselves from 
them, and to call them into question.  I perceive, and I find myself with a powerful impulse 
to believe.  But I back up and bring that impulse into view and then I have a certain 
distance.  Now the impulse doesn’t dominate me and now I have a problem.  Shall I 
believe?  Is this perception really a reason to believe?  I desire and I find myself with a 
powerful impulse to act.  But I back up and bring that impulse into view and then I have 
a certain distance.  Now the impulse doesn’t dominate me and now I have a problem.  
Shall I act?  Is this desire really a reason to act?  The reflective mind cannot settle for 
perception and desire, not as such.  It needs a reason.  Otherwise, at least as long as it 
reflects, it cannot commit itself or go forward. 
CHRISTINE KORSGAARD, THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY 93 (1996). 
62 See, e.g., Anahad O’Connor, The Struggle for Iraq: Psychology; Pressure to Go Along with Abuse Is 
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affects their own immediate health or well-being or the health and well-being of those 
whom they most care about.63  None of this is meant to suggest how an individual 
should necessarily approach deciding what is the best way to carry on their private 
lives.  But before one may decide to join or take a position in the public arena, on an 
issue of private or public concern, she needs the security of knowing, while in the 
formulating stage of her thinking, that her willingness to deliberate on the issue will 
not be opened up to public ridicule.  The old aphorism “it is no one else’s business” 
operates in such cases to afford the social distance necessary for one to make up one’s 
own mind unhampered by what others might think.64 
Having specified two significant definitions of “privacy” for legal purposes, 
it is important to state more fully how they might operate to decide a legal case.  The 
definition of “private state of affairs” operates both in the Fourth Amendment area 
and the torts area, depending on whether the claim being brought is against another 
person as in the torts area or presents a legitimate challenge to the police power of the 
state under the Fourth Amendment.  In both cases, the first question that will need to 
be resolved is whether there existed, at the time of the challenged act, a socially 
recognized convention creating a zone of privacy that “defines, protects, preserves, 
or guards that state of affairs for the performance of private acts.”65  Referencing 
society here, rather than the law, as the place where such conventions might arise 
allows for zones of privacy to accommodate changes in technology before being 
recognized by the law in much the same way that new kinds of ownership for 
intangible goods gave rise to the legal recognition of patents, copyrights, trademarks, 
and trade secrets.66  In this respect, society and not law should be the original source 
of conventions that identify what information gets recognized as private.   
With regard to private acts, if the claim is that a seemingly legal prohibition 
in a state or federal statute, regulation, or executive order violates an individual’s 
constitutional right to privacy, the first challenge will be to show that the 
government’s characterization of the prohibited action reveals an infringement of 
either a basic interest in freedom, including of expression, privacy, thought, worship, 
etc., or a basic interest in well-being, including life, physical integrity, and mental 
equilibrium.67  This result, of course, will require that no additional facts or social 
conventions be discretely made part of the interest so described as to convert it from 
a basic into a derivative interest.  Were the latter to become the norm, no prima facie 
 
63 See generally JEREMIAH J. GARRETSON, THE PATH TO GAY RIGHTS: HOW ACTIVISM AND COMING OUT 
CHANGED PUBLIC OPINION 6–7 (2018) (ebook) (arguing that “exposure to lesbians and gays was the defining 
factor that has caused distinctive change on gay rights attitudes as compared to other issues—the theory of 
affective liberalization”). 
64 No One Else’s Business, REVERSO DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.reverso.net/english-
definition/no+one+else%27s+business (last visited Apr. 25, 2020).  
65 See SAMAR, supra note 41, at 73.  
66 See Rich Stim, Overview of Intellectual Property Laws, STANFORD UNIV. LIBRARIES, 
https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/introduction/intellectual-property-laws/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2020); 
Michael J. Formica, Why We Care About What Other People Think of Us, PSYCH. TODAY (Dec. 31, 2014), 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/enlightened-living/201412/why-we-care-about-what-other-people-
think-us. 
67 See SAMAR, supra note 41, at 67–68. 
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claim for privacy protection would ever be secure since the government could always 
stretch the definition of an interest to extend beyond the well-recognized categories 
of basic interests.68  However, an exception to this rule might arise if the government 
were successful at convincing the Supreme Court of the United States that the current 
understanding of private acts falls outside the scope of protections that had been 
previously deemed worthy of constitutional protection.69  In such a circumstance, the 
constitutional right to privacy for private acts would be called into question and so 
would the background analysis being presented here.  So, the question of whether a 
right to privacy for private acts is properly grounded in a constitutional value needs 
now to be considered. 
 
III.  JUSTIFYING A LEGAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY  
 
Thus far, this Article has described serious privacy concerns arising from an 
“unequal access to learning” personal individual information created by “private 
commercial mechanisms of information capture, production, analysis and sales.”70  
The Article has pointedly acknowledged the dominance over aspects of consumers’ 
personal liberty and privacy that the private sector of the economy maintains by the 
use of this technology.  It has also recognized an even greater threat to individual 
privacy and personal liberty, as state (and maybe the federal) governments begin to 
draw upon the massive amount of data collected by data brokers to fight a global war 
against the Covid-19 pandemic.71  Currently, there are over 101, 087,195 confirmed 
cases of the virus worldwide and the number of deaths worldwide is 2,174,702.72  But 
these numbers change substantially every day.  In the United States alone, as of 
January 27, 2021, the reported number of cases of Covid-19 infections is 25,172,433 
and the number of deaths is 419,827.73  What these numbers attest to is the likely need 
 
68 See id.  
69 This is because the Constitution was interpreted by the Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803) to afford the Supreme Court the sole power of judicial review as to what the Constitution 
means and whether acts of Congress comport with it.  In the words of Chief Justice Marshall: 
[I]f a law be in opposition to the [C]onstitution; if both the law and the [C]onstitution 
apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to 
the law, disregarding the [C]onstitution; or conformably to the [C]onstitution, 
disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs 
the case.  This is of the very essence of judicial duty.  If, then, the courts are to regard the 
[C]onstitution; and the [C]onstitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature; the 
[C]onstitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.   
Id. at 178.  
70 Zuboff, supra note 6.  
71 See Covid-19: People: How Governments Are Using Personal Data to Fight Covid-19 (UK), HERBERT 
SMITH FREEHILLS (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/latest-thinking/covid-19-people-how-
governments-are-using-personal-data-to-fight-covid-19-uk; see also FAQ: Data and Surveillance, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 19, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-
data/faq-surveillance.html.  
72 Covid-19 Coronavirus Pandemic, WORLDOMETER, https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/? 
utm_campaign=homeAdvegas1?%22%20%5Cl%20%22countries (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
73 U.S. Covid-19 Cases and Deaths by State, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/cases-in-us.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2021). 
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to continue gathering information at least until this pandemic comes under control.  
But even if that becomes true in the next several months as various vaccines become 
available, decision-makers will likely want to plan for the next pandemic or crisis.  If 
they do, they will likely still want access to the information contained in data banks, 
and the private sector will likely want to continue gathering information to create new 
markets, even after Covid-19 is swept into the dustbin of history.  Additionally, this 
Article has articulated a framework drawn from prior case law in the United States 
for understanding the concept of privacy as engaging two separate, but interrelated, 
ideas: the notion of a private act and the idea of a private state of affairs.  Before, 
however, we can proceed to use this information to suggest what might be done to 
protect individual privacy and liberty in the present and future, we need to make 
explicit the normative foundation for concluding that a robust right to privacy should 
be found to exist as part of American law.  It is to justify just such a right to privacy 
in American law that we now turn. 
 The justification for a right to privacy can be located in human autonomy as 
a value widely shared both in the United States and much of Western Europe.74  And 
while there is certainly evidence that some other cultures value autonomy, it should 
not be thought that valuing autonomy is just a culturally relative phenomenon.  For 
every moral theory to be prescriptive presupposes that the persons it addresses are 
free agents, and so autonomy must be an important baseline for any moral theory to 
operate.75  Indeed, there has been much literature on the value of autonomy in moral 
theory, and although the question of a more universal construction need not concern 
us here,76 autonomy is a centrally important value in such highly influential moral 
theories as those of  Immanuel Kant, J.S. Mill (in his discussion of self-regarding 
goods), and Alan Gewirth.77  Furthermore, although there are different ways 
 
74 Mahmut Alpertunga Kara, Applicability of the Principle of Respect for Autonomy: The Perspective of 
Turkey, J. MED. ETHICS 627 (2007) (“The concept of autonomy is a manifestation of Western culture, which 
emphasizes individualism, personal happiness and self‐actualization.  In this context, ‘personhood’ is viewed 
from the perspective of autonomy and individual rights.” (citing Charles Olweny, The Ethics and Conduct of 
Cross‐Cultural Research in Developing Countries, PSYCHO-ONCOLOGY 3:11–20 (1994))). 
75 See ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 16–17, 138 (1978). 
76 I do not mean to suggest that there may not be other justifications for autonomy not contingent on a 
society’s existing beliefs.  But for purposes of treating American law, I need not go this further step toward a 
universal human rights justification.  See SAMAR, supra note 41, at 205–08. 
77 For a broader understanding of the role autonomy plays in moral and political philosophy, including the 
important role of autonomy to Kant and Mill, see generally Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (July 28, 2003), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/.  
Alan Gewirth acknowledges the importance of autonomy when he distinguishes rational autonomy as having 
two senses, a broad sense and a strict sense.  See GEWIRTH, supra note 75, at 138.  In the broad sense, every 
person sets his or her own laws or principles of conduct.  See id.  Here, autonomy will not mean that one will 
always act in a manner consistent with liberal tradition.  Id.  In the strict sense, it means that the principles “one 
chooses for oneself will have been arrived at by a correct use of reason, including true beliefs and valid 
inferences.”  Id.  Laws properly made should impose no intrusion on this.  “For the rational agent views the law 
[here meaning the justified moral law] not as something imposed on him from without but rather as something 
he imposes on himself . . . .”  Id. at 303.  Gewirth’s understanding of human autonomy is consistent with human 
dignity.  His idea is “that human beings possess a special value intrinsic to their humanity and as such are worthy 
of respect simply because they are human beings.”  Human Dignity, CTR. BIOETHICS & HUM. DIGNITY, 
https://cbhd.org/category/issues/human-dignity (last visited Apr. 26, 2020).   
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autonomy might be understood, common among all of them is that it is “directed by 
considerations, desires, conditions, and characteristics that are not simply imposed 
externally upon one, but are part of what can somehow be considered one's authentic 
self.”78  For our purposes, I shall follow the more baseline etymological description 
for ‘autonomy’ that derives “from the Greek roots auto meaning ‘self’ and nomos 
meaning ‘custom’ or ‘law.’”79  This reflects both “the political sense of the word” in 
terms of “a group's right to self-government or self-rule” as well as the more common 
usage of independent control.80  Indeed, autonomy allows for the recognition of moral 
and cultural values in society, even in cases where the law has not afforded them 
recognition.81   
So, starting with this understanding of autonomy, which seems certainly 
consistent with our earlier discussion of the concept of privacy, we can now say that 
if a society values autonomy, it must certainly value protection of private acts.  For 
these represent actions undertaken where no other rights or basic interests are 
involved.  But our definition of a private act does more than just make clear the way 
that privacy is related to autonomy; it opens the door to an understanding of why 
private acts need to be protected.  If a society values autonomy in the sense of self-
rule, it must assign equal value to private actions, as they constitute the ideal case 
examples for valuing autonomy.  That is because, under the definition posited above, 
such actions are “self-regarding” in that no other person’s basic interest (outside the 
relevant group) are intruded upon.  This description also helps to make sense of the 
reason put forth earlier that absent a court’s determination that the action is not 
protected, it should be thought, prima facie, as one which the Constitution should 
rightly protect.82  Especially this is true if the action is one that the Supreme Court 
 
78 STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 77. 
79 Autonomy, VOCABULARY.COM, https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/autonomy (last visited Apr. 26, 
2020).    
80 Id. 
81 Consider, for example, jury nullification.  Jury nullification “occurs when a jury returns a verdict of ‘Not 
Guilty’ despite its belief that the defendant is guilty of the violation charged.  The jury in effect nullifies a law 
that it believes is either immoral or wrongly applied to the defendant whose fate they are charged with deciding.”  
Doug Linder, Jury Nullification, UMKC SCH. OF L. (2001), 
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/zenger/nullification.html. 
82 It has been noted that:  
The Supreme Court does not use the phrase "personal autonomy" very often.  Unlike 
privacy, it is not a fundamental right.  As such, it is still a very limited concept regarding 
its impact on legal jurisprudence. 
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992), the Court emphasized the impact that Roe 
v. Wade (1973) had on the importance of personal autonomy, especially with regard to 
reproductive rights.  The Casey Court wrote, "[I]f Roe is seen as stating a rule of personal 
autonomy . . . [then the Supreme Court's] post-Roe decisions accord with Roe's view that 
a State's interest in the protection of life falls short of justifying any plenary override of 
individual liberty claims . . .  
[N]o erosion of principle going to liberty or personal autonomy has left Roe's central 
holding a doctrinal remnant."  
 In Washington v. Glucksberg (1997)[,] however, the Court appeared to oppose the 
concept that personal autonomy creates personal protections for individuals.  "And 
although Casey recognized that many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due 
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should find necessary to the preservation of the democratic order that has as its end 
the promotion of individual autonomy, then clearly it should be protected.  The reason 
for saying an end of the democratic order is protection of individual autonomy will 
be made clear below.   
 As was also earlier explained, a private state of affairs presupposes the 
presence of recognized conventions for identifying the information covered as private 
or the place designated as one where performance of a private action should be 
allowed.  Along with that understanding is why we are even concerned with 
protecting information and places.  It was earlier noted that human beings are affected 
because of their social nature by what other people think about them, whether or not 
they should be so affected.83  This can easily give rise, if a person’s private activities 
are brought into a public spotlight, to cause him to refrain from performing actions 
that may cause him ridicule, even in circumstances where the actions may have 
assisted him toward developing a greater understanding of himself or the decisions 
he is making.84  Obviously, it has to be reasonably undeniable that the actions do not 
harm any non-consenting person outside the relevant group, if the protection is to be 
maintained.  All this is to say that a society which views private actions as worthy of 
protection, because they represent ideal case examples of human autonomy (a priori), 
must also value the protection of information and places without which such private 
acts would be unlikely to occur (a posteriori).85  Granted the latter protection may be 
the product of our human need for social acceptance and the costs that sometimes 
arise from failure to gain acceptance; still, as this need is widespread throughout 
society, it should not be easily dismissed.  Certainly, there are points where people 
 
Process Clause sound in personal autonomy, it does not follow that any and all important, 
intimate, and personal decisions are so protected.  Casey did not suggest otherwise.” 
Personal Autonomy, LEGAL INFO. INST. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/personal_autonomy (last 
visited May 21, 2020) (first quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 835, 860 (1992); 
and then quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 518 U.S. 1057 (1996)).  
 Evidently, while the final significance of a right to personal autonomy may be far from certain, 
there is reason to believe it is becoming a more central value focus of the law.  Note, for example, 
the Court’s statements in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 671 (2015):  
Glucksberg did insist that liberty under the Due Process Clause must be defined in 
a most circumscribed manner, with central reference to specific historical practices.  Yet 
while that approach may have been appropriate for the asserted right there involved 
(physician-assisted suicide), it is inconsistent with the approach this Court has used in 
discussing other fundamental rights, including marriage and intimacy. 
The Court’s Obergefell decision clearly limited the scope of the Glucksberg decision while 
expanding the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause’s conception of liberty to include same-
sex marriage even though same-sex marriage, unlike marriage, was not part of a long-standing 
tradition as recognized in Glucksberg.   
83 Cass Sunstein notes how: 
[s]ocial influences can lead people to go quite rapidly in identifiable directions, 
often as a result of ‘cascade’ effects, involving either the spread of information (whether 
true or false) or growing peer pressure.  Sometimes cascade effects are highly localized 
and lead members of particular groups, quite rationally, to believe or do something that 
members of other groups, also quite rationally, find to be silly or worse. 
CASS SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 16 (2001). 
84 See SAMAR, supra note 41, at 100–01. 
85 Id. at 88–89. 
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need to overcome the need for acceptance, as in the case of joining a violent gang, 
but such cases are best set aside as unworthy of privacy protection when non-
consented-to violence is clearly present or may be inferred to be present because there 
is evidence of serious immaturity or the intellectual inability to understand what is 
expected.  Otherwise, people can fall into the trap of always just following the status 
quo without affording much thought to why this should be the case. 
 A final point for this Section relates to the connection between privacy of 
information and places and participation in democratic society.  The first thing to note 
is that being allowed to participate in governmental decision-making customarily 
takes place in representative republics by electing those who will make decisions for 
the society.86  Use of the popular vote might be thought to be the foundation of a 
democratic society and certainly is justified under an autonomy principle meant to 
affirm citizens’ right to decide who are best to fill positions in the government.  But 
here one must be cautious.  Societies like the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(“DPRK or “North Korea”), the People’s Republic of China, and the Republic of 
Cuba may all make use of a ballot box, but if there is no real opposition to the party 
in power when choosing the candidate, let alone any real opposing points of view to 
governmental policies and laws publicly disseminated, the effect will not be to further 
the citizens’ ability to choose the person they believe is best for the position but, more 
accurately, to merely rubber stamp the candidate the party has already chosen for 
them.87  In such circumstances, it cannot be said that individual citizenship autonomy 
is affirmed, notwithstanding the procedural nicety of the vote, and one would have to 
conclude that such a practice cannot satisfy valuing autonomy generally absent a real 
opportunity for changing the system.  I point this out because the way the concern for 
protecting autonomy in democratic decision-making might be met is to guarantee 
privacy of information and provide citizens the space to figure out what their interests 
are so that when they do vote, they will be voting based on their own interests.88  This 
 
86 In his book Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review, Professor John Hart Ely argues for a 
representation-reinforcing theory of judicial review that attempts to resolve the two paragraphs of the now-
famous footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) concerning popular 
control and egalitarianism by focusing on process.  See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A 
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).  He argues that “a system of equal participation in the processes of 
government is by no means self-evidently linked to a system of presumptively equal participation in the benefits 
and costs that process guarantees; in many ways it seems calculated to produce just the opposite effect.”  Id. at 
77.  In essence, Professor Ely argues that courts should opt to preserve majority government while at the same 
time preserving minority rights by ensuring real participation in the democratic process.  In regard to privacy 
specifically, he notes the “Fourth Amendment can be seen as another harbinger of the Equal Protection Clause, 
concerned with avoiding indefensible inequities in treatment.”  Id. at 97. 
87 See North Koreans Vote in “No Choice” Parliamentary Elections, BBC NEWS (Mar. 10, 2019), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47492747; Party Tricks: Cuba’s Communists Bar “Alternative” 
Candidates from Local Elections: How the Castro Regime Keeps Serious Challenges Off the Ballots, THE 
ECONOMIST (Nov. 23, 2017), https://www.economist.com/the-americas/2017/11/23/cubas-communists-bar-
alternative-candidates-from-local-elections.  China is more complex.  Under Article 97 of the Constitution for 
the Peoples Republic of China, competitive elections of People’s Congresses at various levels are allowed.  
However, “[t]hese elections are still dominated and controlled by the [Chinese Communist Party], which firmly 
upholds the one-party rule and allows only one official ideology.”  Jie Chen & Yang Zhong, Why Do People 
Vote in Semicompetitive Elections in China?, 64 J. POL. 178, 178–89 (2002). 
88 See SAMAR, supra note 41, at 95. 
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is why earlier I noted that protecting individual autonomy (in this case the privacy of 
information and places) needs be an end of democratic government.  Thus, the claim 
that democratic governments should affirm autonomy as an end is based on the idea 
that citizens will need sufficient privacy of information and places to determine what 
persons, polices, and laws truly represent their views.89  So, there is clearly an internal 
arrangement between democratic process and privacy of information and places that 
must be present to guarantee that the resulting social order is truly grounded in valuing 
autonomy.  In the next section, I will take up how best to satisfy autonomy in the 
context of resolving conflicts between a privacy right’s protection and protections 
afforded by other rights.  I will also consider the case where not a right but a 
compelling state interest is involved and how a court might resolve that sort of 
conflict.  
 
IV. APPLYING THE LEGAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
 
A. CONFLICTS OF RIGHTS AND COMPELLING STATE INTEREST 
 
 A conflict of rights involving privacy occurs when a prima facie claim to 
privacy conflicts with another active right that is also necessary to fostering individual 
autonomy.  Such rights “are those that permit the holder of the right to perform an 
action, such as making a speech [including the gathering of public information], 
publishing a news report, or practicing a particular religious belief.”90  In each of these 
instances there is an implied claim to negative freedom in the sense of the self-to-be-
let-alone.  This implied claim justifies the right being grounded in autonomy and 
allows autonomy to operate as the common denominator for deciding among the right 
claims which one will dominate.  In such cases, “any conflict between two or more 
active rights should be resolvable on the basis of which right better promotes 
autonomy in general.”91  Put another way, the “determination should be based on 
which action is most likely to promote the autonomy of all persons who stand in the 
same relation,” reflecting the relational nature of a privacy claim.92   
This approach, however, will only work for conflicts among active rights 
where both rights can be found to support autonomy.  Passive rights, by contrast, are 
those that afford the rights’ holder “a benefit, such as trial by his or her peers, a speedy 
and public trial, the right to compulsory process to obtain the testimony of witnesses, 
and the right to the assistance of counsel.”93  Consequently, when an actor performs 
 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 104. 
91 Id. at 107. 
92 Id. at 108. 
93 Id. at 104.  Passive rights are best thought of as interests that “are intrapersonal in the sense that they 
represent specific benefits due the holder, rather than an unspecified freedom to act.”  Id. at 105. “Active rights 
are signaled by statements of the form ‘A has a right to φ’[where A is the rights holder and B is the respondent]; 
while passive rights are signaled by statements of the form ‘A has a right that B φ’ (in both of these formulas, 
“φ” is an active verb).”  Rights, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Rev. ed 2020), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights/ (last visited 1/1/21). 
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an action that impinges a passive right, “the conclusion has to be (at least where the 
interest is a basic interest) that between the two parties involved that there is no valid 
claim to privacy.” This follows from the definition of a private act. 94  Thus, in the 
Fourth Amendment area where autonomy would normally support protecting the 
selective disclosure of information to protect private actions, a privacy right will not 
be recognized if there is probable cause to believe another’s basic interest (e.g., life 
or physical integrity) might be at stake.  Similarly, in tort law, certain kinds of 
intrusions are allowed and not considered violations of privacy if they are consented 
to because individual autonomy would be undermined if such intrusions were not 
allowed.  For example, “cases allowing reasonable investigations into a person’s 
credit status can be explained in terms of an explicit consent that is rendered on 
applying for credit.  However, the situation becomes more troublesome when 
companies that receive these reports, then attempt to  sell or give the information to 
others without the applicant’s permission.”95 In that case, an active rights conflict 
arises between the credit company, which wants to sell information for profit, and the 
credit applicant, who wants the information to remain private.  When this situation 
occurs,  autonomy is best served by restrictions on the release of information obtained 
solely for the purpose of supporting a credit application. 
In the context of a compelling state interest, the concern is not over which 
interests foster maximal autonomy but whether the state’s interest “is more 
fundamental to fostering autonomy than [it] is [to] protecting privacy.”96  Here I will 
focus on the government’s interest in stopping the spread of Covid-19, as it presents 
a broad range of privacy concerns that implicate cyber-security and other matters.  
Covid-19 is a very harmful and deadly disease that spreads when droplets of saliva 
come into contact with the face of another person as by a cough, sneeze, or just by 
speaking too closely.97  As a consequence, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (“CDC”) recommends that people limit themselves from being in public, 
except when absolutely necessary, such as when a person needs to buy groceries, see 
a doctor, or work in an “essential” industry.  The CDC also recommends wearing 
facemasks made of cloth when in public and engaging in social distancing of at least 
six feet.98  Because the disease is so prevalent and so deadly (especially for older 
people; people with chronic health conditions like diabetes, asthma, or serious 
 
94 SAMAR, supra note 41, at 105. 
95 Id. at 107.  See also DAVID F. LINOWES, PRIVACY IN AMERICA: IS YOUR PRIVATE LIFE IN THE PUBLIC 
EYE? 107, 126–39 (1989). 
96 SAMAR, supra note 41, at 107. 
97 CDC Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Frequently Asked Questions: How Does the Virus 
Spread?, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/faq.html 
(last visited May 7, 2020). 
98 CDC Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): How to Protect Yourself and Others, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/prevention.html 
(last visited May 7, 2020). 
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respiratory illnesses;99 and some children100), and because it is easily spread by simply 
being in close proximity to another person where precautions are either not available 
or not undertaken, the government has a compelling interest in imposing restrictions 
on what otherwise would be a private right to travel and visit with other people.  The 
restrictions are compelling insofar as they are the minimum necessary to provide 
protection for individual autonomy against a disease that, if left alone, would cause 
loss of life or otherwise seriously impair victims’ well-being.  Of this concern there 
is little doubt.  Consequently, it should not be surprising that governments will seek 
to gather information on individual behavior from all sources, including private sector 
data banks.  However, the fact that the government has a compelling interest does not 
mean that it is free to impose any restrictions it pleases, nor to use the information 
obtained for purposes unrelated to preventing the spread of the disease.   
The way privacy operates where a compelling state interest overrides a right 
to privacy is to have privacy provide the regulatory standard against which the 
maximum amount of intrusion on the right is the minimum necessary to achieve the 
government’s compelling interest.101  Where to draw the line on what is minimally 
necessary in the Covid-19 case may be legitimately debated among medical experts, 
especially as it bears, for example, on what kinds of tests or restrictions are best to 
detect and prevent the virus from spreading.102  The standard proposed here is the 
minimum necessary to achieve the government’s compelling interest to protect 
against loss of life or serious physical harm.  But how is this standard to be assessed?  
One of the means the government uses to protect against the spread of the virus is to 
 
99 George Citroner, Here’s What Older At-Risk People Should Know About the Coronavirus, HEALTHLINE 
(Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.healthline.com/health-news/what-older-people-with-chronic-conditions-need-to-
know-about-covid-19. 
100 Perri Klass, Rethinking Covid-19 in Children, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/12/well/family/coronavirus-children-covid-19.html. 
101 See SAMAR, supra note 41, at 115.  This standard has been recognized by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in regard to racial classifications in public university admissions programs under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause that are justified by a compelling state interest.  In Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003), for example, the Court stated: “As we have explained, whenever the government 
treats any person unequally because of his or her race, that person has suffered an injury that falls squarely within 
the language and spirit of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection.”  But that observation 
says nothing about the ultimate validity of any particular law; that determination is the job of the 
court applying strict scrutiny.  When race-based action is necessary to further a compelling 
governmental interest, such action does not violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection 
so long as the narrow-tailoring requirement is also satisfied.  
Id. (citations omitted).  In Grutter, the compelling interest was to ensure student body diversity in an educational 
environment, which at the time, and probably for a generation, thereafter, would not have been possible without 
an admissions procedure that considered race as one of several admissions factors.  Recall Justice O’Connor’s 
comment at the end of her majority opinion: “The requirement that all race-conscious admissions programs have 
a termination point ‘assure[s] all citizens that the deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and 
ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the service of the goal of equality itself.’”  Id. at 342 
(citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989)).  Similarly, in regard to Covid-19, the 
compelling interest that in some circumstances justifies overriding privacy is preservation of autonomy, the end 
and ground of privacy itself. 
102 See Madeline Johnson, Experts Debate Whether Point of Care COVID-19 Testing Can Help Flatten the 
Curve, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/clinical/experts-debate-
whether-point-care-covid-19-testing-can-help-flatten-curve. 
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require in most states that, at various stages of the pandemic, individuals will need to 
“shelter in place,” meaning not leave their residences to go to work or school, but 
only leave to go grocery shopping, see a doctor, or perform a state-recognized 
essential service.103  Needless to say, this has had a great short-term effect on the 
economy, leading to millions of lost jobs.104  And this itself raises an intriguing 
question: how much loss of life or threat of serious infection needs to be present in 
order for the government to restrict these activities?  The formula described above is 
based on individual rights, not on a utilitarian calculation of how much death is 
acceptable.  Still, does that mean the government is free to restrict any activity, even 
where loss of life or the threat of serious infections are minimal?  Can it even be 
known for sure how much loss of life or how many serious infections are likely to 
occur?  I do not rest this matter just on an appeal to the limitations of our current 
knowledge, even less on some kind of utilitarian calculation.   
Part of the problem here is that any model developed to serve the public 
interest will necessarily be inductive.105  That is to say, it will draw together 
probabilities of various events occurring, including accidents to the extent they can 
be predicted, to determine the probability of predicted results.  As a consequence, no 
model based on human behavior or even just the behavior of physical phenomena will 
ever be 100% certain.  The most it will ever be able to produce is a reasonable 
prediction of what is likely to happen, if all the conditions specified come about.106  
In the case of Covid-19, many, but not all, of these conditions will involve how 
carefully human beings follow CDC and other appropriate medical advice.  (I say 
“not all” because there could be other factors in the environment, including in the way 
the virus itself gets transmitted, that are, as yet, unknown.)  Still, such models offer a 
reasonable basis for limiting governmental regulation to only what appears needed to 
effectively respond to the crisis.  This is not a backdoor to some kind of utilitarian 
calculation of how many deaths may be acceptable, but a substantive ground for 
determining reasonableness in protecting individual autonomy by establishing a 
criterion for when a restriction is the minimum necessary to further the government’s 
compelling interest.  Consequently, if the current standards set for preventing 
infections are likely to protect human autonomy, assuming everything works as 
 
103 See Sarah Mervosh et al., Which States and Cities Have Told Residents to Stay at Home, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-stay-at-home-order.html. 
104 See Brian Menickella, Covid-19 Worldwide: The Pandemic’s Impact on the Economy and Markets, 
FORBES (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brianmenickella/2020/04/08/covid-19-worldwide-the-
pandemics-impact-on-the-economy-and-markets/#12e2de6f28c3.  See also COVID-19: Impact Could Cause 
Equivalent of 195 Million Job Losses, Says ILO Chief, UN NEWS (Apr. 8, 2020), 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/04/1061322.  In the United States, the number of people unemployed is over 
twenty million as of April 16, 2020.  Lucia Mutikani, Coronavirus: Over 20 Million Americans Have Now 
Applied for Unemployment Benefit, WORLD ECON. FORUM (Apr. 16, 2020), 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/04/united-states-unemployment-claimants-coronavirus-covid19/. 
105 See Afschin Gandjour, Inductive Reasoning in Medicine: Lessons from Carl Gustav Hempel’s 
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predicted, and if additional restrictions are not deemed necessary, unless chosen at 
the individual level, then the government’s imposition of these standards is narrowly 
drawn for present purposes.  And should further restrictions be needed in the future 
or should existing restrictions be justifiably lessened (because the viral spread comes 
under control), then the fact that privacy remains a regulatory standard should call 
attention to making these further adjustments.   
A related matter is very important because it has been seriously affected by 
the Covid-19 pandemic.  This is the right to engage in productive labor as a type of 
private action.107  There is a serious disagreement among those who are unemployed: 
some consider it dangerous to return to work too early, while others wish to return to 
work right away to be able to continue to survive financially.108  For reasons already 
identified, the state’s concern to protect against the spread of the Covid-19 virus 
satisfies being a compelling interest for restricting going back to work too soon.  What 
may not be satisfied is the further requirement that the interest be narrowly drawn so 
to not unnecessarily overburden the economic context in which shelter-in-place 
orders operate. 
 
107 The right to productive labor has not been recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States, and 
where it has been recognized, for example, by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, it was recognized 
to support a state statute that allows workers in union-shops to opt out of having to pay union dues in return for 
continued employment.  See Steven Alan Adams, State Supreme Court Upholds Right to Work Law After Five-
Year Long Court Battle, THE PARKERSBURG NEWS AND SENTINEL (May 7, 2020), 
https://www.newsandsentinel.com/news/local-news/2020/04/state-supreme-court-upholds-right-to-work-law-
after-five-year-long-court-battle/.  This is not the sense of the right being discussed here.  For my purposes, I am 
considering the right to work as a privacy right that the state should not interfere with absent a compelling 
interest.  Such a right fits the definition of a private act and fits the idea of a human right as described by Professor 
Alan Gewirth:   
The right to employment is both a negative and a positive right.  It is a negative right 
in that all other persons and groups have the correlative duty, consistent with moral 
requirements of the principle of human rights, to refrain from interfering with an agent’s 
obtaining, performing, or retaining productive and remunerative work.  This duty to 
refrain includes the duty not to impose obstacles that prevent persons from working 
because of considerations of race, religion, gender, or other criteria that are irrelevant to 
the ability to perform the kind of work that is in question.  It also includes the duty not to 
exclude persons from jobs, or fire them from jobs they already have, because they have 
objected to their work conditions on grounds of health or safety. 
ALAN GEWIRTH, THE COMMUNITY OF RIGHTS 217–18 (1996).  This right does not, however, prohibit 
union membership because of the serious unequal bargaining position between the worker and the 
employer.  With regard to the way this right to work has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of West Virginia, it is worth taking note of Gewirth’s further comment that: 
The negative right to work receives a further interpretation wherein its correlative respondents 
or duty-bearers are labor unions.  This interpretation is used by employers who object to having union 
membership made a condition of employment.  The inequalities of power [between management and 
labor], however, make this interpretation of the right morally unacceptable. 
Id. at 218.  
108 See Quint Forgey, Poll: Large Majority of Americans Think it’s More Important to Stay Home than 
Return to Work: Only 30 Percent of Respondents Think the Top National Priority Should be to Get the Economy 
Up and Running Again, POLITICO (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/23/poll-majority-
americans-important-to-stay-home-than-return-to-work-203427. 
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In a capitalist society, personal survival is usually dependent on being able 
and willing to engage in productive labor.109  Consequently, if such labor is absent, 
because of a shelter in place order, the very concern that supports imposing a 
compelling interest to not go to work, namely, support of personal autonomy, now 
works the other way.  The minimum intrusion on one’s privacy right to work obliges 
the state in these circumstances to provide, where possible, the means for remaining 
healthy and financially secure during the shelter-in-place period.  Thus, the 
government violates individual autonomy when it legitimately imposes a shelter-in-
place order but does not, at the same time, provide the means necessary to counter the 
financial effects arising from having to follow the order by, for example, not going to 
work.110  Of course, the government can only go as far to counter financial effects as 
its resources allow.  However, this acknowledgement of “ought implies can” should 
not be a serious deterrent for a first world country, like the United States, which 
presumably could draw upon a variety of different resource possibilities, including 
adding to its deficit.111  This does not mean that the state has to provide the same 
revenue that someone might make if they were working in a high-paying job, but 
especially for low-paying jobs and jobs that cannot be performed offsite and online, 
the amount of support an individual receives during a health crisis such as Covid-19 
should be nearly the same as what they would have received were they at work, 
including healthcare and other essential benefits.112  And although this is a matter of 
legislative prerogative, nevertheless, since a fundamental right to privacy in the form 
of returning to productive work is being impacted when the right to work is barred, it 
would seem that this alone should impose an immediate moral and political duty on 
Congress to provide all financial and health assistance within its capacity to offset the 
economic and health effects of shelter-in-place orders.113  
 
109 See Adam Hayes, Important Features of Capitalism, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 26, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/040715/what-are-most-important-aspects-capitalist-system.asp. 
110 Kelsey Snell, What’s Inside the Senate’s $2 Trillion Coronavirus Aid Package, NPR (Mar. 26, 2020), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/03/26/821457551/whats-inside-the-senate-s-2-trillion-coronavirus-aid-package. 
111 Immanuel Kant describes “ought implies can” as follows: “[t]he action to which the ‘ought’ applies 
must indeed be possible under natural conditions.  These conditions, however, do not play any part in 
determining the will itself, but only in determining the effect and its consequences in the [field of] appearance.”  
IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 540 (1787).  As of the time of this writing, Congress is discussing 
a second stimulus bill to further offset the financial and health effects of Covid-19 following its recent support 
for small businesses and testing.  See Erica Werner, House Passes $484 Billion Bill with Money for Small 
Businesses, Hospitals, and Testing to Prevent Coronavirus,      WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2020/04/23/congress-coronavirus-small-business/; see also Erica 
Werner, House Democrats Pass $3 Trillion Coronavirus Relief Bill Despite Trump’s Veto Threat, WASH. POST 
(May 15, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2020/05/15/democrats-pelosi-congress-
coronavirus-3-trillion-trump/.  For information on the first stimulus bill, see supra note 110 and accompanying 
text. 
112 Although this Section of the Article focuses on privacy invasions caused by the government’s recent 
efforts to protect against the spread of Covid-19, it should be assumed that much of the argument here would 
also support providing financial protections for workers suffering other unexpected, non-voluntary disruptions, 
including downturns in financial markets.  See generally GEWIRTH, supra note 107 (providing a broader 
discussion of the right to productive agency and what should be done to sustain and protect it).  
113 For purposes of this discussion, I ignore the fact that many shelter-in-place orders are imposed by state 
governments, not the federal government, because the federal government is certainly involved in responding to 
this national crisis and should be coordinating a national response.  See, e.g., Sharon Parrott et al., CARES Act 
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B.  DEALING WITH COMMERCIAL TECHNOLOGICAL INTRUSIONS ON 
INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY  
 
So far, we have considered some ways the right to privacy limits government 
intrusion on personal choices, even in the face of a global pandemic.  What I now 
wish to consider is how a right to privacy might limit private sector data banks from 
gaining unequal access to information about personal wants and desires that might 
then be used to manipulate not only sales but other personal and political choices one 
might make.  It has already been briefly explained in Section I how such information 
might be gathered usually without knowledge of the person from whom the 
information is acquired.  And it was also explained how, once gathered, the 
information might then be turned toward not only satisfying existing desires but 
promotion of new wants and desires.114  What is particularly significant about both 
uses, especially when treated in combination, is how they can be manipulated to affect 
individual behavior in the targeted audience.  Recall from Section III how our human 
psychology allows information to affect the performance of private acts.  Such 
manipulations, as arise when massive amounts of personal information are directed 
toward affecting behavior, raise a serious threat to personal autonomy, even when it 
appears the targeted audience’s wants and desires are being satisfied, especially if 
those desires are either manufactured or so narrowly routed as to blind the targeted 
audience from other considerations.115  Moreover, if the private sector is left to its 
own devices, such abuses will likely continue because they are also highly 
profitable.116  So, what is to be done to avoid such manipulations of private 
information?   
Obviously, the government will need to be involved to offset the commercial 
financial motivations that promote intrusions on personal privacy,117 but that may 
itself become problematic, if the government wishes to use information gathered by 
the private sector for its own purposes.  What is needed is a way to constrain the 
private sector, not so much from collecting information (provided there is not a 
reasonable expectation of privacy that is being intruded upon), but from then 
manipulating the data so collected to affect the behavior of private individuals and 
groups.  If the government is to be the guarantor of this protection, how can protection 
be ensured, given the government’s own legitimate concern for sometimes having 
 
Includes Essential Measures to Respond to Public Health, Economic Crises, but More Will Be Needed, CTR. ON 
BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.cbpp.org/research/economy/cares-act-includes-
essential-measures-to-respond-to-public-health-economic-crises.  See also Liz Alderman, Paid to Stay Home: 
Europe’s Safety Net Could Ease Toll of Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/06/business/europe-coronavirus-labor-help.html. 
114 See supra Section I (discussing Galbraith). 
115 See Galbraith, supra note 30, at 128–29. 
116 See GeoCities, 127 F.T.C. 94, 97–98 (1999) (involving a company’s violation of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act by selling personal information gathered from its member applications to use its website 
despite having promised its members it would not disclose their information). 
117 See, e.g., id.  
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access to the information to protect the autonomy of all?  It would appear that the 
latter interest might attenuate affording too much protection to private information, 
but if that is the case, where is the line to be drawn? 
 A good way to begin this presentation is to see first how privacy might apply 
in the area of private commercial gatherings of information.  It has already been stated 
that privacy in the torts area encompasses seclusion and solitude, which include 
interests in not having embarrassing not-newsworthy facts revealed about oneself, not 
being placed in a false light, and not having one’s likeness taken for commercial 
purposes without permission.118  That said, how should the commercial mechanisms 
for gathering information by monitoring “posts, pictures, interactions and internet 
activity in real time” be properly restricted?119  Since some of these sources are placed 
in the public realm by the internet user, there cannot be a complete expectation of 
privacy as to who may ultimately obtain them.  For example, even if limits are placed 
on one’s Facebook account so that content is shared only with friends, how friends 
may further disseminate the information when using other apps cannot be 
guaranteed.120   
At first glance, it may appear that posting photos or information only to 
friends is, like closing the shutters to one’s windows, a convention socially recognized 
“that defines, protects, preserves, or guards” that information only to be shared among 
the designated users.121  If so, then in the same way a peeping Tom may be sued for 
violating privacy, the law should recognize a similar tort claim against those who 
knowingly violate an established convention designed to protect private information 
from getting disseminated broadly.122  However, this presupposes that the further 
dissemination of the information is intentional.  What if the information dissemination 
occurs because of a benign use of apps already on one’s phone or computer?123  
Additionally, should the receiver of the information bear any liability provided they 
did not conspire to obtain the information by offering an inducement to the non-
original holder?   
Particularly problematic challenges arise in the tort area when those against 
whom a privacy claim is made themselves claim a First Amendment right to receive 
the information.124  This will likely be the case where information is gathered (perhaps 
widely) without any obvious intrusion on the seclusion or solitude of anyone else, and 
 
118 For a discussion of the cases in this area, see supra Section II.  
119 Zuboff, supra note 6. 
120 David Baser, Hard Questions: Should People Be Able to Share Their Facebook Information with Other 
Apps?, FACEBOOK (July 26, 2018), https://about.fb.com/news/2018/07/sharing-info-with-apps/. 
121 SAMAR, supra note 41, at 73.  Note that violations of privacy in this area are viewed as intentional torts.  
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (AM. L. INST. 1977). 
122 Daniel Solove provides a helpful discussion of the kinds of interests a tort right to privacy should 
encompass.  See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 477, 560 (2006) (discussing 
privacy problems arising from the use of technology to increase accessibility, surveillance, and facilitate “the 
gathering, processing and dissemination of information”). 
123 See Emily Eposito, The Five Best Data Collection Tools in 2019: The Best Apps for Gathering Data in 
the Field, ZAPIER (May 10, 2019), https://zapier.com/learn/forms-surveys/best-data-collection-apps/. 
124 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (stating that “[i]t is now well-established that the 
Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas . . . regardless of their social worth”).  
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even more so if the privacy claim is directed against having merely gathered the data 
from sources that appear in the public domain.125  In such circumstances, courts will 
have to decide where the privacy claim leaves off and a First Amendment right begins.  
This can be particularly difficult where the party who claims her privacy was intruded 
upon is far removed from the actual gathering or compiling of the information.  Here, 
it is important to remember that autonomy can provide a justification for both the First 
Amendment right to receive information as well as the individual’s privacy right to 
not have personal information revealed about oneself.  Still, finding a bright-line rule 
to discern the boundary between these two rights will not be easy and may produce 
inconsistent results depending on exactly how the information was obtained.  Of 
course, such a claim might be handled by a conflict of rights analysis in which 
autonomy provides the common denominator to determine in a particular case which 
right should dominate.  But the problem there is not that such an analysis will not 
work, but that it would have to be employed in possibly a great many cases where 
factual differences arising from the application of different and evolving technologies 
may be relevant.126  For this reason, limiting decisions in these cases to just a conflict 
of rights approach or a traditional common law tort approach, even when adjusted for 
First Amendment claims, may not be the most efficient way to go about resolving 
these issues on a broad scale.  And so, the question becomes how to best protect 
individual autonomy in a way that is both consistent and uniform, but also recognizes 
the legitimate interests of those seeking information as well as those seeking to keep 
personal information about themselves private. 
Federal legislation limiting not so much the gathering of information from 
public portals but its use to affect individual behavior would seem to be the better 
approach.  Such legislation would avoid running afoul of the First Amendment right 
to receive information by focusing only on limiting its clandestine use when directed 
toward affecting private individual behavior.  In other words, information gathered 
about the wants and desires of various groups, even when developed along 
geographical, political, or cultural lines, could still be obtained, provided the 
information was not obtained illegally, was primarily commercial in nature, and was 
not specifically directed to affecting any particular individual user’s behavior without 
their knowledge.  This limitation, however, would not apply if the source (or its well-
identified affiliate) had been approached by the ultimate user to gain information 
 
125 See Gathering Private Information, DIGIT. MEDIA L. PROJECT (May 22, 2020), 
http://www.dmlp.org/legal-guide/gathering-private-information. 
126 It has been noted that: 
[R]ecent advances in information technology threaten privacy and have reduced the 
amount of control over personal data and open up the possibility of a range of negative 
consequences as a result of access to personal data.  In the second half of the 20th century 
data protection regimes have been put in place as a response to increasing levels of 
processing of personal data.  The 21st century has become the century of big data and 
advanced information technology (e.g. forms of deep learning), the rise of big tech 
companies and the platform economy, which comes with the storage and processing of 
exabytes of data. 
Privacy and Information Technology, STANFORD ENCYC. OF TECH. (Oct. 30, 2019), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/it-privacy/. 
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about oneself, as, for example, in obtaining a credit report.127  Because this is an area 
of commercial speech, legal restrictions on information dissemination (especially 
where it is likely to be directed at affecting individual behavior) are fought with less 
concern for protecting autonomy generally than would be the case if the information 
disseminated was, for example, political in nature.  Indeed, restrictions on commercial 
speech usually invoke only an inquiry as to whether the “governmental interest is 
substantial” and “not more than necessary to service that interest.”128   
Such a statute, as I am suggesting here, should pass constitutional muster 
when challenged on the basis of this First Amendment commercial speech test, since 
protection of private information certainly constitutes a substantial governmental 
interest, provided the intrusion is narrowly drawn to not bar a commercial advertiser 
or marketer from gaining legitimate access to publicly available consumer 
information.  Where the issue becomes more complex is when the information 
gathered in a general data bank is used to promote not commercial but specifically 
political advertising.129  In that instance, the limitation set out by the statute would, of 
course, need to be justified as serving a stronger, perhaps compelling interest of the 
state, as well as being narrowly drawn, because such information is often associated 
with becoming a knowledgeable voter.130  But presumably, this higher scrutiny test 
could be satisfied by further showing how advances in the technology of gathering 
and compiling information have undermined the very autonomy the First Amendment 
itself is designed to protect.  That is to say, while previously a governmental unit may 
not substitute its view as to which solicitations a householder may wish to receive, it 
 
127 See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970). 
128 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).  There, the Supreme 
Court, per Justice Powell, set out a lesser standard from strict scrutiny for when the government may restrict 
commercial speech.  According to Justice Powell, that lesser standard 
must [first] determine whether the expression is [even] protected by the First 
Amendment.  For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must 
concern lawful activity and not be misleading.  Next, we ask whether the asserted 
governmental interest is substantial.  If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must 
determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, 
and whether it is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. 
Id. 
129 In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761, 771 (1976)), the Court, per Justice Powell, stated:  
In rejecting the notion that [commercial] speech ‘is wholly outside the protection of the First 
Amendment,’ we were careful not to hold “that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms” of 
speech.  We have not discarded the “’common-sense” . . . distinction between speech proposing a 
commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation, and 
other varieties of speech.  To require a parity of constitutional protection for commercial and 
noncommercial speech alike could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the 
Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech. 
130 In Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Gov’t, 444 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1980), the Court in finding 
unconstitutionally overbroad, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Village’s ordinance 
prohibiting door-to-door solicitations for charitable organizations that did not ensure 75% of its receipts were 
for charitable purposes, abrogated an earlier case, Breard v. Alexandria, 441 U.S. 622 (1951), which had upheld 
a criminal ordinance applied to door-to-door solicitations of magazine subscriptions but “did not indicate that 
the solicitation of gifts or contributions by religious or charitable organizations should be deemed commercial 
activities, nor did the facts of Breard involve the sale of religious literature or similar materials.”  
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could nevertheless “punish those who call at a home in defiance of the previously 
expressed will of the occupant.”131  Technology has now transformed this previous 
First Amendment test so that persons operating computers and using the internet, 
which are now used in the regular course of living,132 cannot just put out a no-
solicitation sign to those sending information the person does not desire or want to 
receive, and even attempts to “unsubscribe,” after the fact, are not always very 
successful.133  What a federal statute might do in such a circumstance to protect the 
internet user’s privacy would be first to create a national “Do Not Solicit” registry, 
analogous to the National Do Not Call Registry that puts telemarketers on notice that 
the user does not wish to be bothered.134  Beyond this, Congress could adopt a statute 
empowering the Federal Trade Commission to more broadly regulate the data 
collection industry (and especially the nine largest brokers of information) to ensure 
their data collection will not affect individual autonomy.  One way for Congress to 
do this might be to codify the following FTC recommendations regarding data 
collection and its use, since that would allow a line to be drawn where data brokers’ 
gathering and use of information ends and consumer privacy begins.  
 
For data brokers that provide marketing products, Congress should 
consider legislation to: 
● Centralized Portal. Require the creation of a centralized 
mechanism, such as an Internet portal, where data brokers can 
identify themselves, describe their information collection and use 
practices, and provide links to access tools and opt- outs; 
● Access. Require data brokers to give consumers access to their data, 
including any sensitive data, at a reasonable level of detail; 
● Opt-Outs. Require opt-out tools, that is, a way for consumers to 
suppress the use of their data; 
● Inferences. Require data brokers to tell consumers that they derive 
certain inferences from raw data; 
● Data Sources. Require data brokers to disclose the names and/or 
categories of their data sources, to enable consumers to correct 
wrong information with an original source; 
● Notice and Choice. Require consumer-facing entities—such as 
retailers—to provide prominent notice to consumers when they 
 
131 Martin v. Shutters, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1948) (involving conviction of a member of the Jehovah 
Witnesses for delivering a leaflet to the inhabitant of a home in violation of a city ordinance prohibiting any 
such solicitation).  See also Barr v. American Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020) (holding 
that the robocall restriction of the Telephone Communications Act of 1981 is unconstitutional, but only the 
exception for calls to collect on a debt owed the government, as a content-based exception, in violation of the 
First Amendment). 
132 Andrew Perrin & Maeve Duggan, Americans’ Internet Access: 2000-2015, PEW RES. CTR. (July 26, 
2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2015/06/26/americans-internet-access-2000-2015/.  
133 Eric Griffith, How to Unsubscribe from Unwanted Email, PCMAG (Dec. 2, 2019), 
https://www.pcmag.com/how-to/how-to-unsubscribe-from-unwanted-email. 
134 See, e.g., Do Not Call Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-10, 117 Stat. 557 (2003) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6151–6155 (2008)). 
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share information with data brokers, along with the ability to opt-
out of such sharing; and 
● Sensitive Data. Further protect sensitive information, including 
health information, by requiring retailers and other consumer-facing 
entities to obtain affirmative express consent from consumers before 
such information is collected and shared with data brokers. 
 
For brokers that provide “risk mitigation” products, legislation 
should: 
● When a company uses a data broker’s risk mitigation product to 
limit a consumers’ ability to complete a transaction, require the 
consumer-facing company to tell consumers which data broker’s 
information the company relied on; 
● Require the data broker to allow consumer access to the information 
used and the ability to correct it, as appropriate. 
 
For brokers that provide “people search” products, legislation 
should: 
● Require data brokers to allow consumers to access their own 
information, opt-out of having the information included in a people 
search product, disclose the original sources of the information so 
consumers can correct it, and disclose any limitations of an opt-out 
feature.135 
 
It needs to be emphasized that the above protections do not prevent the mere 
gathering of consumer information; all that is being prevented is publication of the 
personal information that has been gathered and its use to affect behavior, usually 
without the knowledge of the person whom the information is about.  This it does by 
requiring, before any personal information about a person is shared, and especially 
where the information may be used to affect that person’s market behavior, that the 
information be made known to the person about whom it is about and the person be 
given an opportunity to opt-out from any further sharing or use.  Such conventions as 
these operate less to warn of information that may be private, as would be the case in 
the traditional torts area, and more to reassert the information’s status as private after 
it is acquired.  Still, the conventions are ideal for handling information that may have 
been gathered without a direct intrusion on the seclusion or solitude of the targeted 
individual or where the targeted individual would have otherwise had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  Because the area is technologically complex, the details of 
how exactly such restrictions might operate is perhaps best left for a congressional 
committee, taking testimony from experts and then drafting a statute to empower and 
endorse the FTC’s rulemaking authority to regulate the industry.  Following this 
 
135 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3.  The recommended restriction for “Sensitive Data,” including 
health information, is likely to be seen as content-based but of sufficiently high enough privacy importance as 
to be justified by a compelling state interest.  Id.  
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approach would also leave open the door for further regulations by the FTC, as 
needed, to meet future challenges resulting from new technologies yet to be devised.  
Certainly, such an approach would ensure greater consistency in this area of the law 
than just leaving such matters to the courts to be decided de novo after hearing cases. 
 Before concluding, some more specific attention should be paid to the 
government’s current and future uses of data gathered on individuals by the private 
sector in fighting Covid-19.  Earlier it was suggested that some state governments, 
and perhaps the federal government, are inclined to use data gathered from the private 
sector to try and track the spread of Covid-19.136  Here the question arises whether 
the state’s interest in obtaining information from data brokers will likely result in a 
relaxation of the aforementioned conditions to protect the privacy of individuals. 
 In order to evaluate the state’s use in this context, it is first necessary to 
classify the data being used and then to specify exactly how the state intends to use 
the information.  Arguably, since the data contained in these data banks includes 
highly personal information, certain uses (like to determine political party affiliation 
or willingness to engage in legal protests) need to be subject to the most exacting 
scrutiny (depending on the reason for the use), and the state will need to show a 
compelling interest that is narrowly drawn to gain access to the information.137  
However, if the state is only seeking to identify patterns of behavior leading to 
transmission of the disease without seeking to further identify other aspects of the 
particular individuals or groups to be screened, heightened scrutiny should be enough, 
and the state should only need to provide an important reason for its use.138  Certainly, 
such an important use would be shown in trying to identify patterns of behavior that 
likely lead to transmission of the virus, such as public congregation on beaches or in 
parks.  The fact that the state might also use this information to determine where it 
needs to provide greater policing to prohibit congregations of people should not alter 
this conclusion.  Obviously, if the state were to go further by trying to use the 
information gathered in a criminal proceeding, such a use ought to require that the 
usual Fourth Amendment standard be met, namely, that the state first obtain a warrant 
from a judge after providing sufficient facts to suggest that there exists probable cause 
of criminal activity.139  Even provided these concerns are followed and their 
 
136 See supra Section I. 
137 See generally CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LSB10451, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN THE WAKE OF 
CORONAVIRUS (2020). 
138 In Skinner v. Railroad Labor Executives, Inc., 489 U.S. 602 (1989), the Supreme Court recognized a 
diminished expectation of privacy for railroad workers having to submit to drug tests to ensure railroad safety 
under the then Railroad Safety Act of 1970, 45 U.S.C. § 437(a) (1994).  What the Court first enunciated in 
Skinner has taken on a broader application to now include, under the rubric “special needs doctrine,” drug testing 
of high school athletes, see Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); testing at “sobriety” 
checkpoints on the highway, see Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); and twenty-four-
hour lifetime GPS monitoring of persons released from civil commitments after having served their time for 
committing sexual offenses, arguably to reduce recidivism, see Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2016).  
See also 14AA Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 675 (4th. ed. 
2020).  
139 But see Belleau, 811 F.3d at 940 (Flaum, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that information gathered 
from a program that seeks to reduce recidivism of sex offenders “may, at some later time, be used as evidence 
in a criminal prosecution, but that is not the primary purpose of the program”). 
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corresponding restrictions implemented, there may still be reason for concern that the 
state’s interest in gaining access to private data banks will unduly attenuate the 
necessary privacy restrictions that need to be put in place for people to feel free to 
perform private actions.  But perhaps the best approach here, where information on 
how the material is used is still developing, is to be watchful for uses that seem less 
justified and to be ready to challenge them in both the courts and public arena. 
A related problem to anticipate is where the executive branch of the federal 
government might actually encourage data brokers not to lose interest in developing 
banks of information by itself becoming the primary consumer for such information.  
This might occur if it were thought that the information gathering was necessary to 
avert an existing or even future crisis.  Alternatively, the various departments of the 
executive branch might seek to create their own data banks of personal information 
on U.S. citizens beyond what is constitutionally allowed.140   
Here I believe the private-public separation can provide some safeguard, but 
only if the private sector is willing to uphold its interest in not having the government 
compete in creating unrestricted data banks of information.  In regard to the federal 
government, the way this might work would be if public interest groups, like the 
American Civil Liberties Union, challenged any such attempt at information 
gathering by the government as raising a separation of powers issue when not 
approved by Congress.  Private industry might also challenge such an effort by the 
government arguing that a diminution of a property interest under the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause is likely to occur, if such an action were perceived to 
undermine user confidence in how private information gathered is being used.141 
Additionally, private nonprofits, acting on behalf of the public, could launch a 
 
140 See, e.g., EDWARD C. LIU & CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44042, GOVERNMENT 
COLLECTION OF PRIVATE INFORMATION: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES RELATED TO USA PATRIOT ACT 
REAUTHORIZATION IN BRIEF (2011).  It should be noted that several existing federal statutes already limit how 
the federal government can use information; others allow greater use.  See National Security Act of 1947, 50 
U.S.C. §§ 3001–3234 (1947) (creating the Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency).  See also 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3701 (1968) (controlling interception of wire 
and oral communications by both the government and private parties); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. (1978) (detailing how government can use physical and electronic surveillance 
to gather information on foreign powers and those operating as agents of other nations if there is a suspicion of 
terrorism or espionage); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2523 (1988) 
(extending the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement to electronic communications); Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA 
PATRIOT) Act of 2001, 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b) (2006); PATRIOT Sunsets Extensions Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 
112-114, 125 Stat. 216 (2011) (permitting enhanced surveillance of foreign nationals and Americans suspected 
of terrorism); Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 2006, 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010 (2006) 
(requiring telecommunications companies to cooperate with government efforts to obtain information); Protect 
America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (2008) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(a)-(c)) (altering 
the definition of “electronic surveillance” under FISA so the government could gather information without a 
warrant from persons outside the United States whether American citizens or not and be able to demand 
information from telecommunications companies); USA Freedom Act of 2015, 12 U.S.C. § 3414 (2015) (ending 
the National Security Agency’s mass telephone data collection program).  Additionally, sixteen federal agencies 
are part of the national intelligence community including the CIA, the FBI, and the NSA, the latter two being 
created by executive order.  See Exec. Order No. 12333, 3 C.F.R. § 1981 (1981). 
141 See generally Jennifer J. Kruckeberg, Note, Can Government Buy Everything?: The Takings Clause 
and the Erosion of the Public Use Requirement, 87 U. MINN. L. REV. 543 (2002). 
  
 Journal of Legislation                  38 
 
political campaign against the government having too easy access to highly personal 
information, analogous to what they did with regard to the reauthorization of the 
PATRIOT Act in 2011.142  These different approaches support individual autonomy 
even if they are not directly grounded in autonomy.  For they continue both politically 
and legally the kinds of approaches that are most likely to advance greater protection 
of information privacy into the future.  All this goes to suggest only that while 
government’s involvement with private data brokers may not be an easy connection 
to sever, still, the possibility of its severance is not improbable, provided the public 
remains vigilant of individual autonomy and determined in its willingness to protect 
personal privacy.   
 
 CONCLUSION  
 
This Article has sought to give further recognition to some of the difficult 
privacy issues that have arisen in the U.S. by large private sector data brokers being 
able to create wide-ranging, unrestricted banks of highly personal information on U.S. 
consumers.  It has also sought to raise concerns over how some state governments 
(and maybe the federal government) are seeking to access this information to halt the 
spread of the deadly Covid-19 disease.  These problems do not arise in a vacuum but 
arise in the context of our various human interactions with technology and our 
willingness to protect our own individual autonomy in the process.   
The history of the law of privacy, as it has developed in the Fourth 
Amendment, tort, and constitutional areas, combined with a theory of privacy’s 
meaning and justification, can provide the needed tools for preventing the most 
egregious invasions of personal information, provided the institutions of our 
democracy are willing to afford these tools their necessary attention.  But in the end, 
this will depend on how attentive the public is to make sure privacy protections 
remain in place and are sufficient to meet the challenges of our ever-evolving, 
technologically advancing society.  The tools themselves open up avenues that 
Congress and state legislatures can take, but those will only be as good in how well 
they protect individual privacy and autonomy as the public demands.  What is of 
upmost importance now, especially as the government becomes more involved in 
gathering personal information to fight off a deadly disease, is to not lose our way by 
failing to protect individual autonomy, but instead to remain vigilant in guarding the 
protection of private acts, as well as private information and states of affairs, so they 




142 See LIU & DOYLE, supra note 140. 
